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Introduction
Unlike the "intelligent cities" in other regions of Southeast Asia, Indonesian cities 
have not yet surrendered the realm of discipline to the policing technology of security 
cameras. Instead, the guardhouse (known popularly as gardu) is still the prime 
resource for community defense, state policing, and surveillance. The reason for the 
proliferation of gardus in the urban landscape lies not only in the incapacity of the city 
to provide alternative security systems for its residents, but also in the active role the 
gardu still plays in the modality of Indonesian urban life.
Indonesians who have lived in urban Java would recognize the gardu as a gathering 
place (mostly for men) for nightwatch schemes and for leisure (including gambling 
and gossiping). Many of them would also recognize the variety of forms gardus have 
taken. The minimal one (generally found in rural areas) is often made from bamboo, 
wood planks, and a thatch roof. Usually supported on stilts (see Figure 1, below) and 
measuring about two by two meters, it is open on the front side and may or may not 
include a door.
11 would like to thank the Cornell University Southeast Asia Outreach Program and the Netherlands 
Institute for War Documentation (NIOD) for supporting a period of library research on this project. This 
paper has benefited from discussions with various persons, especially Jan Breman, Freek Colombijn, 
Anthony King, Peter Post, Bambang Purwanto, and Fransiska Prihadi, who has also taken photographs for 
this essay. I am of course responsible for any remaining shortcomings.
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Figure 1. A Gardu at the entrance to a kampung in Surabaya, circa 1920s. K1TLV, reprinted with permission.
In cities, the gardu is often a more permanent construction. It is like a tiny house 
made of brick often with a sofa or chair inside or beside it. In the new towns of major 
cities, gardus have occasionally been fashioned in elaborate styles, with high baroque 
motifs and Javanese architectural elements (see Figure 2, below). Those men who 
participate in the nightwatch—the primary function of the gardu—are armed with 
hand weapons that include a long bamboo, with its head shaped like a fork, a wooden 
stick, sometimes knives or machetes, but not firearms. The nightwatch's key 
instrument, however, is the kentongan, a hollowed-out tree branch with a cleft down 
the middle that produces sound when it is struck with a stick. Hung on the doorway of 
the gardu, the kentongan is used by members of the ronda (a group consisting of adult 
males on patrol) to sound an alert or send other messages to the community 
concerning the state of neighborhood security.
Gardus are visible at almost every junction in major cities in Indonesia, especially in 
the urban centers of Java. They are placed sporadically as well as strategically at 
sidewalks, over ditches, at the junctions of streets, at the entrances to kampungs, and at 
the gates of commercial buildings and housing complexes, as well as at the fronts of 
houses. During the period of national election campaigns that followed the collapse of 
Suharto's rule, they were painted in the symbolic colors of certain political parties and 
adorned with the party's banners, stickers, and slogans. During the celebration of 
Independence Day, they appeared in red and white, the colors of the national flag (see 
Figure 3, below).
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Figure 2. A baroque gardu in a gated housing complex, 2003. Photo: F. Prihadi.
Figure 3. A gardu in the colors of the national flag. Taman Permata Indah, Kampung Gusti, 2003.
Photo: A. Kusno.
Indonesians would thus recognize the gardu as an artifact that represents security and 
order, with connections to both the state and local power. Profoundly visible after the 
May 1998 riots, gardus (especially for the ethnic Chinese) also trigger memories of 
chaos, disturbance, and insecurity. Soon after the collapse of Suharto's government, the 
gardu had also been harnessed by the then-opposition party, the PDI-P (Partai 
Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan, Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle), to 
mobilize supporters and recall memories of Sukarno, the father of the party's leader, 
Megawati. (See Figures 4 and 5, below.)
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This essay is about the interplay between urban memory, monuments, and 
symbolic struggles over identity and place. Benedict Anderson, who was perhaps the 
first to recognize monuments as an important type of "symbolic speech" for 
Indonesian political cultures (rather than simply an expression of the state's ideology), 
points out that "few observers have recognized that monuments are a type of speech, 
or tried to discern concretely what is being said, why form and content are specifically 
what they are."2 Anderson suggests that to understand the intention and context of a 
particular culture, it would be important to analyze the form and the content of its 
monuments, even though we could not fully account for the role of these monuments 
in forming and transforming collective identity. Various meanings can indeed be 
invested in a single object. Yet it is precisely the fragmentary and imprecise nature of 
the experiences of monuments that has made the interpretative reading of these objects 
so important. By looking at the signifying functions of gardus, this essay aims to 
connect work on the spatial dimension of community identity with a study on 
Indonesian monuments and forms of memorialization.
However, it is important to recognize that the gardu is a form of "symbolic speech" 
that is intended to be neither a monument nor a memorial, even though in some cases 
(as this essay will show) it performs such functions. As a tiny construction located at 
the margin of "monumental" structures, the gardu is often neglected by urban 
conservationists and researchers of the city. As has happened with other urban 
artifacts that have become part of "normal" everyday life, the role of the gardu in 
registering public memory has usually been overlooked. I wish to argue that the 
mundane gardu is just as significant as a formal monument because it plays a crucial 
role in expressing political views, regulating public memory, and defining territory 
and collective identity.
This article examines the political functions and the changing meaning of gardus, 
genealogically, from our own times back to the past. It shows how the gardu has 
continued to be a visual medium through which collective memories are both formed 
and transformed across different historical orders. Instead of seeing the gardu as 
merely a symptom of a recent urban evolution associated with the rise of disciplinary 
society and gated communities worldwide, I aim to reflect on the gardu as an 
institution that embodies specific histories, ones that over time have shaped the 
collective memories of people who have lived through those histories. Such a tracing of 
the history of the gardu requires that we consider an ensemble of discursive moments 
and various signifying practices connected to the experience and territorial defense of 
ethnic Chinese, the Javanese concept of space, the territorial politics of Dutch 
colonialism, and the discourses associated with neighborhood watch under the 
Japanese occupation, as well as the political communications of Indonesians during the 
revolution and post-Independence era. I hope that, by reflecting on the gardu, this 
study will, in turn, encourage scholars to reconsider issues related to urban history, the 
politics of the built environment, and the meaning of guardhouses elsewhere. In other 
words, how does this everyday institution and artifact function as a mnemonic device 
that plays a role in registering public memories?
2 Benedict Anderson, "Cartoons and Monuments: The Evolution of Political Communication under the 
New Order," first published in 1974, updated and reprinted in Language and Power: Exploring Political 
Cultures in Indonesia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), p. 174.
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1. Memories
The Posko o f Megawati and the Platform o f Sukarno
In 1998, on the eve of his resignation, President Suharto said quite bluntly that he 
had no problem with leaving office, but if he were to step down immediately, chaos or 
maybe even bloodshed and civil war would be the outcome, a situation that no one, 
not even his handpicked successor, B. J. Habibie, would be able to control.3 Thus, 
without Suharto and his military governance, Indonesians would find themselves in an 
uncertain and potentially vulnerable position. Suharto was ultimately forced to resign, 
and his "prophecy" that chaos, bloodshed, and unrest would follow has, in large part, 
come true. Soon after the riots in May 1998, which caused the deaths of hundreds of 
residents of Jakarta and prompted Suharto's ouster, other violence erupted. In East 
Java, approximately 120 people accused of witchcraft were killed between December 
1998 and the end of February 1999. In East Timor, massive violence took place, 
involving elements of the Indonesian military. Serious political violence and killings 
occurred in many different parts of Indonesia—in Aceh, Borneo, the Moluccas, 
Western New Guinea—and several bombing incidents took place in major cities on the 
islands of Java, Sumatra, and Bali.
Perhaps as a way of coping with this state of chaos and the fear that riots and 
killings might occur again, the residents of major cities in Java and Sumatra built, at 
their own expense, gardus at almost every corner of the city's streets.4 The ethnic 
Chinese particularly felt this sense of urgency. They built fences and gardus for their 
neighborhoods and participated in nightwatch patrols. They also hired police and local 
hit men to watch over the streets from the gardus. In less than a year, the number of 
gardus and gates multiplied, becoming permanent features of the cityscape.
This community response to chaos was soon appropriated by Indonesia's political 
elites to serve their aim of winning the public's attention. In 1998, the political leaders 
of the then-opposition party, the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P, 
Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan), chaired by Megawati Sukarno Putri, 
initiated the construction of gardus, known popularly as posko (pos komunikasi—that is, 
"communication posts"), at various places throughout the country (see Figure 4).5 In 
response, Jakarta's governor instructed that all the posko be demolished, since they 
were cluttering the cityscape of Jakarta, but the PDI-P paid no heed and continued to 
construct poskos not only in the capital city, but also in other cities across Indonesia.6
3 Kees van Dijk, A Country in Despair: Indonesia between 1997-2000 (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2001), p. 203.
4 For a discussion on security discourses after 1998, see Kees van Dijk, "The Privatization of the Public 
Order: Relying on the Satgas," in Violence in Indonesia, ed. Ingrid Wessel and Georgia Wimhofer 
(Hamburg: Abera Verlag, 2001), pp. 152-67.
5 In less than six months after Suharto stepped down, urban residents across Java and Sumatra saw many 
poskos built by the PDI-P, Megawati's party. There were 862 poskos in the region of Madiun, 1,000 in 
Magetan, and 380 in Ponorogo ("Posko Gotong Royong PDI Terlalu Banyak," Kompas 17 [December 1998]: 
10). By the beginning of 1999, in Semarang, there were 813 poskos; in Kendal, 843; in Kudus, 627; in Demak, 
400; in Jepara and Kati, 750; and in Cilacap, over 1,200. In Jakarta, there were over 1,500 poskos, and in 
some areas, one could find a posko every fifty meters ("Posko Gotong Royong PDI: Bukan Balas Dendam 
Terhadap Kuningisasi," Kompas Cyber Media, January 14,1999; see also "Posko PDI Perjuangan Bukan 
Momok," Kompas Cyber Media, February 1,1999).The average size of a posko is around two by two square 
meters and, depending on the building materials, each costs around forty dollars to construct.
6 "Ancaman dari Posko-posko PDIP," Demokrasi dan Reformasi (August 9-15,1999): 28.
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Figure 4. Posko PDI-P at Tubagus Angke Street with the shape of a pendhopo roof and the image of 
Megawati and an angry bull, 2003. Photo: A. Kusno.
In the urban center of Solo alone, the PDI-P built 262 poskos in less than six months. 
The construction of posko at various street corners coincided with the aftermath of the 
riots of May 1998, when Indonesians, especially the ethnic Chinese, protected 
themselves by constructing more gardus. In a way, followers of Megawati harnessed 
the ethnic Chinese's fear that riots might recur. Through poskos, the PDI-P offered the 
urbanite a sense of order and protection, even though poskos also served to remind 
passersby of violence and the possibility it might erupt again. According to Slamet 
Suryanto, one of the PDFs leaders in Solo, the posko contributed to the creation of order 
and security in the city after it had been damaged by burning, looting, and killing 
during the May 1998 riots:
Since the construction of posko in almost every street in Solo, the condition of the 
city has cheered up. If the post-May riots had made Solo a dead town with very 
few people on the streets, now [as a result of the posko] there is a sense that life 
has begun again.7
From the new poskos, the party also donated money and distributed aid packages to 
poor residents. Roy Janis, one of the leaders of the PDI-P's Jakarta branch, described 
the posko as a structure built for the purposes of "overcoming criminalities in the city, 
preventing students from fighting on the streets, and facilitating the distribution of 
food to the urban poor ... The posko [thus] belongs to the public, while it can be used 
for the party's political campaign."8 In the minds of the PDI-P elite, apparently, the 
presence of the posko suggested the party's concern for the public and symbolized the 
willingness of the political elites to communicate with the populace. As a form of what 
Anderson has called "symbolic speech," the posko moves between the ideology and 
practices of everyday life.
7 "Posko Gotong Royong Untuk Amankan Warga Kota Solo," Suara Pembaruan (October 19,1998), p. 6.
s "Posko Parpol haras di bongkar," Kompas Cyber A ledia, J une 5,1999.
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The PDI-P chose the posko as the symbol of their campaign for various reasons. One 
of the leaders of the PDI-P stated that "the posko is a symbol that could mobilize 
crowds [massa] at any moment. It is also a sign of power."9 To other members of the 
PDI-P, the posko, scattered all over the city and often unattached to any particular 
neighborhood, represented the "homelessness" of the PDI-P after its headquarters had 
been raided and destroyed. This sense of homelessness is well conveyed by the semi­
permanent structure of the posko, which could be torn down and rebuilt quickly in 
other places.
However, there is something more to the posko. For Megawati, the posko was not 
merely a gardu post for communication, an emblem of her political party, but also a 
structure that represented her own public image and that of her father, the first 
president, Sukarno (1950-65). Megawati urged all those who belonged to or 
sympathized with her party to safeguard the posko, to use it properly as a center for 
education, and to avoid any action that would damage its image.10 In the eyes of her 
supporters, the posko embodies Megawati. They called every posko "the headquarters of 
Megawati Sukarno Putri" and displayed photos and drawings of both Megawati and 
Sukarno, positioned to suggest the images were standing on the platform of the posko, 
addressing the audience (see Figure 5, below). The images of Sukarno, in particular, 
invoked history since they depicted a leader whom Indonesians admired. The drawing 
of Sukarno pointing his finger recalled the well-known image of the first president 
standing at a podium, delivering speeches to a mass audience.
I do not claim that most Indonesians think of the podium as an embodiment of 
Sukarno, but evidence suggests the podium has been used to symbolize free speech in 
Indonesia. In 1996, as an act of protest against Suharto's reinstallation of Soerjadi as the 
leader of PDI-P, the followers of Megawati set up a "free-speech podium" outside the 
PDI-P headquarters in Jakarta.11 Placed outside the headquarters, the podium was 
meant to communicate the party's outrage to the Indonesian public, but it also recalled 
the image of Sukarno delivering a spirited speech. For weeks, this free-speech podium 
was used as a prop for speakers who routinely denounced the New Order government 
until it was finally smashed to pieces on July 27, 1996. The PDI-P's posko scattered 
throughout the city and beyond could thus be seen collectively as an icon that sought 
to commemorate the PDI-P's resistance against suppression, the "free-speech podium" 
set up by Megawati's followers, and the symbolic position of Megawati, daughter of 
Sukarno.
9 " Ancaman dari Posko-posko PDIP."
10 Her critics perhaps knew about her concerns, and they often criticized her by looking at what has gone 
wrong with the posko. For instance, the ex-president Gus Dur, in his critique of Megawati, alleged that 
some people have been using the posko for "drinking, gambling, embezzling, and sexual transactions." 
"Gus Dur Komentari Posko Gotong Royong PDI,"Kompas, January 12,1999. The municipal authority also 
challenged Megawati by proclaiming that the placement of many of her poskos disturbed the aesthetics and 
the "visual comfort" (kenyamanan) of the city. See "Posko akan ditertibkan," Pikiran Rakyat, September 14, 
2002.
11 See David Bourchier and Vedi Hadiz, "Introduction," in Indonesian Politics and Society: A Reader, ed. 
David Bourchier and Vedi Hadiz (NewYork, NY: Routledge, 2003), p. 18.
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Figure 5. A posko of PDI-P at Surabaya Street with a painting of Sukarno on the door, 2003.
Photo: F. Prihadi.
In this sense, the construction of posko adorned with the image of Sukarno 
delivering a speech commemorated the violence that had been done to Megawati's 
political party and also sought to reconstitute the historical figure of Sukarno as the 
embodiment of "free speech." The followers of Megawati who invoked this image 
seemed to believe in the power that the podium possesses to concentrate the attention 
of the populace. The connection between Sukarno, the podium, and the people was, in 
fact, emphasized in one of Sukarno's own speeches. In his 1964 Independence Day 
speech, he stated:
For me, this podium—podium of 17th August [Independence Day] is a podium 
of people [podium rakyat], a podium of revolution, a podium that orients the 
determination of our nation! I use this podium as a space for dialogue between 
Sukarno, a person, and Sukarno, the leader of the revolution. I use this podium as 
a space of dialogue between Sukarno, the leader of the revolution, and the 
Indonesian people who are undergoing the revolution ... This is a podium where 
we form a dialogue. It is a place of communication for 103 million Indonesian 
people ... That is why every time I stand on this podium of 17 August, I am not 
only talking to the revolutionary people of Indonesia, but also to all human 
beings undergoing revolution.12
12 Amanat Bung Kamo: Tahtm "Vivere Pericoloso" (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Kendi, 2003), pp. 2-3.
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From the podium, Sukarno gathered the support of his audience, even though most of 
the people in attendance could hardly see or hear him because they stood so far away 
in the crowd. For many, it was only the podium that they saw and could remember 
clearly. Pramoedya Ananta Toer, for instance, recalled the day of Sukarno's famous 
address, but while he could hardly remember the president's messages or facial 
expressions, he had not forgotten the props surrounding the leader, especially the high 
platform, the watchtower, and the loudspeaker that provided the setting for the 
event.13 The attraction of a leader who, when standing on a platform before an 
audience, figures as both a subject who sees and an object to be seen is inseparable 
from the changing modality of "seeing power" in traditional Java. (Below I will discuss 
the mutual gaze in traditional Java and how it binds persons considered to be powerful 
with their audiences.)
Figure 6. Posko PDI-P at Wijaya Street, located above the alleyway to a kampung. 
It recalls the image of a podium, 2003. Photo: F. Prihadi.
Megawati's posko were placed at nearly every street corner of the city (see Figure 6, 
above) in order to contact people and tell them something like "we are here to protect 
and serve you, and this structure represents the authority and the benevolence of our 
leader." Often without the consent of local residents, such a posko can assume the role 
of a territorial marker. Banners on some of the posko proclaimed messages such as "this 
is the territory of Banteng" (this banner showed a black "angry" bull, an icon of the 
PDI-P), "PDI-P is the party for the young people [anak muda\," and "you are entering 
the territory of PDI-P."14 For the followers of Megawati, what mattered most about the 
posko was not what it claimed, but that the posko, wherever it was located, should 
radiate its influence outward, reaching as far as possible.15 For them, the establishment 
of poskos (as well as their destruction by political rivals) was part of a political 
maneuver aimed at assuring the maintenance and expansion of their sphere of 
influence.
13 As suggested in Rudolf Mrazek, Engineers o f Happy Land: Technology and Nationalism in a Colony 
(Princeton, NT: Princeton University Press, 2002), p. 213.
14 "PDI Perjuangan, si Raja Posko," Demokrasi dan Reformasi, April 5-10,1999, p. 28.
11 "Beribu Pesan Bertebaran di Jalan," Kompas, March 31, 2000.
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The poskos and banners of Megawati did not only compete with those from other 
political parties, they also engaged with the billboards and advertisements widespread 
throughout the city. Political ideologies were thus set up alongside the ideology of 
market capitalism, both claiming the right to the city.
Pendhopo and the Boundary o f Traditional Power
The posko constructed throughout Jakarta by rival political parties were meant to 
broadcast the mission of those parties: " ... to help residents to overcome various 
problems that have emerged as a result of recent political situations."16 In doing so, 
they echoed messages previously delivered by traditional Javanese authorities and 
became involved in Javanese spatial politics of a kind that had been going on for 
generations. The posko of Megawati and her rivals frequently harked back to a Javanese 
symbol of power much older than the podium. Many poskos adopted the roof shape of 
the pendhopo because this shape manifests most clearly the "old" Javanese concept of 
power and authority.17 The pendhopo is a pavilion-like structure that stands in front of a 
Javanese housing compound (see figure 7). It is visible from the street and accessible to 
people (mostly male). Standing in front of the Omah (the inner structure of the Javanese 
house), the pendhopo mediates between the ruler and the ruled, the inner and the outer 
circle, by integrating the latter into the former's sphere of influence. As a symbol of 
traditional authority, the pendhopo thus spatializes the Javanese concept of power.18 
Members of Javanese society often associate the pendhopo with an umbrella (payung) or 
a banyan tree (waringin), for it shelters people and offers a space for them to come 
together.19 By virtue of its spatial capacity to draw people into its domain (the practice 
of mengayomi), many Javanese believe that the pendhopo represents the power and 
authority of the owner of the house. They also assume that if the owner is powerful, he 
ought to be able to absorb everything from everywhere into his pendhopo. If the 
attractive center of the master's domain, represented by the pendhopo, is powerful, then 
there is no need in the traditional polity to mark the boundary of the ruler's territory, a 
demarcation that would limit the centripetal forces of the center. In the competitive
16 A leader of a PDI-P branch makes this statement, cited in "Posko Gotong Royong PDI terlalu Banyak," 
Kompas, December 17,1998, p. 10.
17 See Benedict Anderson, "The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture," in Language and Power (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1990), pp. 17-77. We could extend Anderson's analysis by indicating that the 
sultans and power elites in Java associate their residences with the center of power. They share the idea 
that power emanates from their residence outward, in concentric circles, reaching as far as possible to the 
outermost territories. They also believe that the extent of their sphere of influence is based on whether 
their power is diminishing or increasing at the center. They know that, although the center of power is 
grounded in their residence, the extent of that center's influence cannot be decisively determined, since its 
outer limit is characterized by fluidity and uncertainty. For a discussion of the Javanese house, see 
Gunawan Tjahjono, "Center and Duality in the Javanese Dwellings," in Dwellings, Settlements, and 
Traditions: Cross-Cultural Perspectives, ed. J. P. Bourdier and Nezar A1 Sayyad (Berkeley, CA: International 
Association for the Study of Traditional Environments, 1989), pp. 213-36; Josef Prijotomo, Ideas and Forms 
of Javanese Architecture (Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada Press, 1984); Revianto Budi Santosa, "Omah: The 
Production of Meanings in Javanese Domestic Settings" (Master's thesis, McGill University, 1997).
18 For a comprehensive analysis of the Javanese concept of power, see Anderson, "The Idea of Power in 
Javanese Culture."
19 The pendhopo is also associated with Mount Meru, the image of which is partly derived from the 
truncated pyramid shape of the roof (Joglo) supported by the four master pillars (soko guru) at the center. 
The master pillars and the Joglo roof suggest a concentric circle, which represents the master's sphere of 
influence, integrating subjects from the surroundings, as well as from the outer realms.
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field of power, the higher, bigger, and more encompassing pendhopos would 
presumably play a significant role in attracting more followers.
Figure 7. A royal pendhopo inCirebon, 2003. Photo: A. Kusno.
Thus the posko of today's political parties perform, in some ways, the function of 
the traditional pendhopo, a mediating structure where people were supposed to find 
power, protection, and security. Entering the pendhopo, one becomes part of the sphere, 
an act that resembles the movement of neighborhood residents who visit a posko 
seeking help and assistance. It is an act similar to passing through a gate, where one's 
identity is (temporarily) transformed, changing the visitor from an outsider to an 
insider. It is striking, but logical, that many poskos use the roof shape of pendhopo to 
increase their influence and incorporate members (see Figure 4, above).
In precolonial Java, the importance of the pendhopo lay not only in its capacity to 
invite and absorb allies, but also in its ability to conceal the king behind the walls of his 
residence. In contrast to the more common, open pendhopo, the king's entryway was 
entirely walled in. His invisibility and inaccessibility guaranteed his power. He only 
appeared on particular, ritual occasions, as the key figure in a procession that passed 
through a series of royal gates and pendhopo without showing itself to the people. The 
grand, royal pendhopo, which represented him, was all that people could see.
This old symbolism collapsed—at least visually—when Sukarno appeared on the 
podium. To the thousands of commoners, the appearance of Sukarno on the high, open 
platform meant that the hidden power of the leader had been displaced or had finally 
emerged and offered itself to them. No other form of communication could more 
convincingly demonstrate the newness of Sukarno's approach. Sukarno's 
comparatively modern white suits and his spontaneous speech were all in stark
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contrast to the heavily ritualized procession of the king hidden behind or under the 
pendhopo. As seen by the commoners, Sukarno embodied a power that was visible, the 
power of a new leader who had (to a remarkable degree) freed himself from the grasp 
of traditional symbolism.
What I am suggesting here is that the fragmented images of the past lingered on in 
modern constructions. Sukarno's podium gained its power from displacing (if not 
replacing) the image of the traditional pendhopo. Both Sukarno's podium and the king's 
pendhopo, in turn, have provided precedents for Megawati's posko. Yet while Megawati 
adopted parts of her father's legacy, she adapted others. Notably, she directed her 
message to a different audience. Sukarno's audience was indeed the people (rakyat), 
and, regardless of whether they understood his speech or not, it was through the 
people that he gained political legitimacy. Megawati's primary audience, by contrast, 
was the "middle class," who feared the people (known in her time as the massa) whom 
the elites had been trying to avoid and control.20 While Sukarno stood on a podium 
and spoke directly to the people, Megawati usually presented herself through her 
representations, in the form of the many poskos available on every street corner. If the 
podium of Sukarno symbolized his mobilization of the masses, whom he summoned to 
continue the revolution, the posko of Megawati called for power, security, and order. 
Megawati's call for stability actually borrowed from the legacy of a different president, 
for it recalled the discourses of her political enemy and predecessor, President Suharto 
(1966-1998).
Pos Hansip and the New Order
What was the posko before Megawati? In the social environment of Suharto, the 
gardu was called pos hansip (post for civil defense). The term "posko" was also used in 
Suharto's time, but it referred to a post for military command (pos-komando), a control 
center temporarily set up by Suharto's military units when they were posted in 
unfamiliar and untamed terrains. The presence of the "military posko" in a volatile 
region delineated the interaction between the army and the surrounding areas that it 
sought to control. "Posko" in the Suharto era was thus a term used in the context of 
combat in a "battleground." The posko aimed at controlling aspects of social and 
political life in the field to assure order and security. We should note that Suharto's 
army men spent most of their careers in a nonurban setting, in rural and jungle areas, 
where they were posted to stop "communism," which was believed to be infiltrating 
rural life. I believe it was in those areas, outside the city, that the term "posko" was first 
used. We can find the term "posko taktis" used in descriptions of the military program, 
Abri Masuk Desa (military joining the village),21 which started in the 1970s. The term 
was also probably used in the documents describing the annexation and pacification of 
East Timor and the other outer islands. When it functions as a structure for controlling
20 For a discussion of the formation and transformation of the Indonesian "middle class" in relation to the 
fear of the "underclass," see James T. Siegel, A New Criminal Type in Jakarta: Counter-Revolution Today 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998).
21 For a reference to "posko taktis," see Jurnal Pelaksanaan Manunggal TNI ABRI Masuk Desa (Jakarta: 
Departemen Penerangan, 1991), p. 34.
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and pacifying unfamiliar and "dangerous" terrains, the posko becomes a symbol of 
menace and insecurity.
Toward the middle of the 1980s, army intelligence began to perceive a change in 
conditions that required them to adapt their operations. For years to come, according 
to army intelligence, security threats would no longer be coming from Aceh, East 
Timor, or the Irian, but most likely would be coming from urban areas. As units of the 
military were discharged from East Timor and the villages, many returned to urban 
Java, where they picked up security jobs with the police, jobs that had been created for 
them in the city. Thus, surplus labor in the army contributed to the militarization of 
urban space. Some ex-soldiers preferred to operate on the streets and organized 
themselves as gangs of urban thugs. Others found themselves involved in pos hansip in 
various neighborhoods, as well as in banks, shopping centers, and new private 
housing complexes, as well as in the houses of the elites. The owners of these sites 
either agreed to hire these security forces or had no choice but to accept the idea that 
Jakarta was an unsafe place and gardus in the form of pos hansips were needed as a 
defense against threats from the streets. Many "homecoming" army officials found 
work in state institutions and private enterprises and registered their presence by 
making the city their official combat zone.
By the 1980s, Suharto's army was engaged in transforming the village-based 
military posko into the urban-based pos hansip. In other words, the army had to change 
the (to them) unfamiliar territory of the city into a familiar place by first ousting all 
imagined and real threats and then installing in strategic places pos hansip as part of the 
urban-based community. To function effectively as the apparatus of the state, the pos 
hansip would have to be immersed in the everyday life of the community. The army 
would accomplish this by facilitating the nightwatch patrols and by providing a space 
for socialization and the monitoring of public life. The transformation of the military 
posko into the pos hansip was crucial to Suharto's politics of space, as crucial as 
transferring the primary location of military operations from the village to the city.22
A billboard from this time, depicting the "development" of rural areas of 
Indonesia, provides a most poignant, but perhaps unconscious, image of this process 
(see Figures 8 and 9, below). On the billboard we see a gardu, which represented the 
order and security of the presumably prosperous village of Cianjur. The gardu also 
represented Suharto's leadership, for the president is depicted giving instructions over 
the radio. Suharto often associated himself with rural folk—orang desa—even though, 
as president, he resided at the center of Jakarta. What is peculiar about this billboard is 
that, while it depicted a village scene, it was intended for an urban audience. Placed in 
the central part of Jakarta, the billboard could be seen as informing the urbanite about 
secure conditions in the desa as well as representing a desire for those conditions to be 
implemented in the city. It was displayed in the mid-1980s, at a critical stage in 
national "development," a time when standardized security measures were about to be 
established in the city.
22 See Aris Santoso, "Operasi Pengamanan ABRI: Dari Hutan Belantara ke Perkotaan," Tempo Interaktif, 
February 2-March 15,1997.
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Figures S and 9. Image of a village gardu shown on the upper left of a billboard displayed in Jakarta by the 
Department of Education. Source: Paul Zach and Gretchen Liu. eds., Jakarta 
(Singapore: Times Edition, 1987).
The city was a relatively new setting for Suharto's army. It only became the major 
site of military operations after East Timor, the villages, and the outer islands had been 
pacified. The soldiers appeared in many guises. In the early 1990s, residents of Jakarta 
occasionally saw units of army men (such as the sapu bersih) in black uniforms (Jakarta 
residents called such men "ninjas") flying down ropes strung from the skyscrapers in 
the business district of Jakarta. As the ninja skillfully surveyed their new terrains and 
impressed the urbanites with their performances, the military officials established 
poskos because, according to military intelligence, the city is far more complex than the 
rural areas and the jungle because "it is hard to identify the enemy combatant in the
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city."23 The military posko that had been stationed in villages and in East Timor were 
thus transferred to the city of Jakarta. From their urban posko, the military units 
gathered information, surveyed movements, and monitored the "cleaning up" of 
potential threats to the city.
Suharto built his regime on the idea of cleansing (-bersih) the nation of communism. 
This obsession with bersih was expressed through the terms used for various military 
missions. The army unit responsible for urban warfare, for instance, was called the unit 
of sapu bersih (sweeping).24 The military also established bureaus, which screened 
citizens to ensure that they were all from a "clean environment" (bersih lingkungan), 
untainted by the kind of social environment conducive to communism. To qualify for a 
job, citizens were required to obtain a certificate of good behavior from the 
neighborhood where they were living as evidence that they did not need to undergo 
"self cleaning" (bersih diri) from communism. It is logical, therefore, that the "clean 
environment" registered itself, most visibly, in the discourses concerning kampung 
improvement projects, the establishment of new urban neighborhoods, and the setting 
up of pos hansip in every neighborhood, since control of the built environment clearly 
verified the state's effort to promote cleanliness. The streets and the kampung of Jakarta 
were identified as "less clean" compared with the sanitized new urban neighborhoods. 
State discourse concerning the new neighborhoods was related to the New Order's 
attempt to create a depoliticized Suharto generation and to induce these citizens to 
forget the image of Sukarno standing on an open podium in a public space, 
concentrating the force of the masses and stirring their passion for revolution.25
The famous governor of Jakarta, Ali Sadikin (1966-1975), was instrumental in 
fulfilling the objectives of Suharto's regime.26 One of his main tasks during his tenure 
was to prevent the retrieval of Jakarta's past as a space for the mobilization of 
revolutionary masses. He made several important moves, one of which was to 
categorize groups of people—"illiterate and unskilled cheap laborers from the 
countryside, trishaw drivers, construction workers, vendors, the homeless, beggars, 
and prostitutes"27—as potentially threatening to the public order. According to the 
governor, these people were part of the mass of Jakarta's poor residents (60 percent of 
the city's inhabitants) who lived in kampung, a term "no longer suitable, given the 
order of the city, for it reminds people of a backward society."28 Throughout his tenure, 
the governor attempted to control the kampung and its inhabitants through "the 
environment security system [siskamling]." "For the easier process of monitoring and 
servicing, I need to limit the number of RT [Rukun Tetangga, Neighborhood 
Association] to forty families and each RW [Rukun Warga, District Administration] to 
fifteen to twenty RT."29 Through this program, the governor co-opted, systematized, 
and upgraded the "traditional" methods of cooperation [gotong royong] that bind
23 As cited in Santoso, "Operasi Pengamanan ABRI: Dari Hutan Belantara ke Perkotaan."
24 Ibid.
25 Abidin Kusno, Behind the Postcolonial: Architecture, Urban Space, and Political Cultures in Indonesia 
(London: Routledge, 2000), chap. 4.
26 Ali Sadikin, however, worked independently and, at the height of Suharto's power, had become one of 
the most established critics of the New Order regime.
27 Ali Sadikin, Gita Jaya: Catatan H. Ali Sadikin, Gubernur Kepala Daerah Khusus Ibukota Jakarta, 1966-1977 
(Jakarta: Pemda Khusus Ibu kota Jakarta, 1977), p. 160.
“ Ibid., p. 112.
29 Ibid.
110 Abidin Kusno
members of a Javanese community and contribute to "humanizing the environment."30 
In his memoir, Sadikin reported that in the 1970s, the Ministry of Defense 
institutionalized the neighborhood watch (ronda), and by 1977, 16,718 persons had 
been trained as officers of civil defense (,hansip). For the purpose of ronda, about 2,280 
gardus (pos hansips) were constructed throughout Jakarta by 1977.?1
The targets for this disciplinary discourse were not limited to the kampung, since 
the privileged were also the targets of surveillance. The governor formed similar 
community organizations for the upper-middle-class neighborhoods. By the late 1980s, 
Jakarta's real estate market for urban housing began to make security a major 
component in the selling of new urban residence (see Figure 10). The grand and 
intimidating gateways, the pos hansips with their security guards, are now the first 
structures developers build when preparing to market new urban housing projects.
Figure 10. Pos hansip at Kelapa Gading housing complex, 2003. Photo: F. Prihadi.
By the 1990s, with the discourse of security and order registered in the minds of the 
urban residents, the pos hansip, attached to buildings and neighborhoods, had become a 
familiar urban feature for the residents of Jakarta. It became the symbol of security and 
order connected to the power of the regime. No matter how varied the styles of the pos 
hansip might be, in the minds of the public they were all connected to one source: the 
state. From this source emanated a constellation of other meanings that were 
associated with private capital, private corporate business, and the prestige of the 
"middle class," as well as their fear of the streets (see Figure 11, below).
30 Ibid., p. 16(S. 
;l Ibid., p. 138.
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Figure 11. The Bali-Sanur garthi for a gated community in Jakarta, 2003. Photo: F. Prihadi.
Many Jakartans who lived in the new urban developments during the New Order 
were aware that the pos hansip functioned as the eyes and ears of the state, guard posts 
from which the government could survey the daily life of the streets and the 
inhabitants of the city. Yet, for the middle class of Jakarta, it was the state that 
supposedly guaranteed their security and the social hierarchy. In fact, the new urban 
neighborhoods where they live continue to spatialize a hierarchical social order. 
Through the pos hansip, both social and physical boundaries have been created for the 
neighborhood. Those who live behind the pos hansip are the "insiders" as opposed to 
the "outsiders," who are wandering the streets. At the pos hansip, one can often find a 
notice: "guests that stay for more than twenty-four hours are expected to file a report," 
or "scavengers cannot enter," a strategy to discourage unwelcome visitors and 
wanderers (see Figure 12, below). This disciplinary method has never worked in 
practice. People are always capable of finding a way in and out of the checkpoint 
without being noticed, and no one seems to bother reporting his or her guests to the 
pos hansip. Nevertheless, with the installation of networks of pos hansips on the streets, 
there is now less chance that unauthorized platforms will be erected for the 
mobilization of crowds. In the time of Suharto, the gardu was indeed a post for 
command and not the place intended to mediate between "Sukarno and his 
revolutionary masses."
That said, it is important to note that although the gardu has become part of the 
political apparatus of the state, it can provide ways for certain groups to conceptualize 
their own defense, especially when the state turns against them. Unprotected by 
government and city security forces during the riots of May 1998 (many believe 
security forces were pulled back as part of the state's strategy to terrorize the 
populace), various communities (especially Indonesians of Chinese background) took
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over the pos hansips in their neighborhoods and resisted the invading mobs from that 
point. The collapse of the Suharto regime destroyed the state network of the pos 
hansips, but the structure has persisted, and its function has been transformed. It has 
been appropriated by communities and individuals who use it to safeguard their own 
properties. Increasing numbers of gardus and gates are now being built, but without 
the authorization of the state (see Figure 12).
Figure 12. A modest gardu in Taman Surya with warning signs: "Guests report every 24 hours; Sorry, no 
throughway; Scavengers cannot enter." 2002. Photo: A. Kusno.
The posko of Megawati exploited the mixed sense of empowerment, fragmentation, 
and insecurity in the public that followed the overthrow of Suharto. Through her posko, 
she communicated the idea of restoring order and security in the neighborhood, a 
discourse that derived ironically from the previous regime, which she had challenged 
in her campaign for the presidency. The gardu provided a vocabulary for Megawati to 
integrate fragments of the past (the precolonial pendhopo, Sukarno's podium, and 
Suharto's militarism), along with the experiences of Indonesia's ethnic Chinese, into 
the consciousness of the present.
2. Traces
The gardu I have been discussing till now looked simultaneously in both local and 
global directions. Today, the gardu is part of a global cultural form and, as part of the 
realm of "gated communities," it is connected to much of the contemporary urban 
world. Yet, it is also part of the specific history of Indonesia. The last two centuries of 
European colonialism contribute greatly to the significance of today's gardu. As we 
have seen, the gardu suggests a clear territorial demarcation, the origin of which can be
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traced back to the spatial politics of the Dutch colonial state. The gardu represented the 
emergence of the colonial state in nineteenth-century Java. That state reorganized 
space in both the Indonesian city and the village. During this same period, the gardu 
also figured as a significant marker for the ethnic Chinese who lived through periods 
of unrest, when violence was directed against them. This section thus deals with the 
earlier forms and practices of gardu associated with Dutch colonialism and the 
experiences of ethnic Chinese.
In two valuable works, Joshua Barker has studied the spatial dimension of 
neighborhood security in the construction of communal identities in urban Indonesia.32 
Examining the institution of neighborhood security, Barker shows the intertwined 
relations between the state strategy of surveillance and the local practices of security 
watch. He illustrates how the state and the local community mutually cooperate and 
contest with each other in defining who are the criminals, the foreigners, and the 
insiders (as well as who are in between). This contestation is marked by a sense of 
territoriality that is profoundly unsettling. Barker's critical observation of the 
intermingling of state and local power encourages us to look at the earlier discourses of 
territoriality that involved Dutch colonial power and the spatial strategies of the ethnic 
Chinese. In what ways did the earlier discourses of territoriality determine the present 
strategies of the state and the local communities?
In their studies of the rural politics of colonial Java, historians Jan Breman and 
Onghokham have traced the complex processes by which a bordered desa (village) 
came into being in the nineteenth century.33 Their accounts are instructive because the 
territoriality of urban neighborhoods investigated by Barker could be seen as deriving 
from the colonial discourses concerned with the bordered desa. The gardu is thus 
intimately connected to the spatial politics of Java under colonial conditions, and it has 
long been part of the apparatus for the structuring of community identity. The studies 
of Barker, Breman, and Onghokham suggest that gardus are tied to a particular 
territory. Their studies also prompt us to consider the ways in which gardus can lead a 
"life" of their own and move across time and space. At one point, they continue to 
serve as an institution of the state and particular neighborhoods; at other points, they 
may operate as sites for resistance; and at other points (as shown above), they work as 
artifacts for memorialization.
If the meaning of the gardu has changed over time as it has been adapted to social 
practices and political projects, its origin is even more obscure. I believe it owes much 
to the emergence of various sites, including that of the cross-regional highway, the 
political construction of the "village community," the formation of city police in early 
twentieth-century Java, and the experience of the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia. What 
social, political, and other effects did the spatial politics of the Dutch have on the 
institutionalization of gardu in the landscape of Java? By way of responding to this 
question, let me first pay tribute to the Javanese concept of space and show how such a
32 Joshua Barker, "A State of Fear: Controlling the Criminal Contagion in Suharto's New Order," Indonesia 
66 (October 1998): 7-43; and "Surveillance and Territoriality in Bandung," in Figures of Criminality in 
Indonesia, the Philippines, and Colonial Vietnam, ed. Vicente Rafael (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Southeast Asia 
Program Publications, 1999), pp. 95-127.
33 Jan Breman, The Village on Java and the Early Colonial State (Rotterdam: Erasmus University Comparative 
Asian Studies Programme, 1980); Onghokham, Social Change in Madiun during the Nineteenth Century: Taxes 
and their Influence on Landholding (The Hague: Institute of Social Studies, 1981).
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powerful system could not by itself generate the tradition of gardu. This tracing is 
necessary to dispose of the traditional, orthodox perception that the much-loved and 
much-hated gardu is really a product of a single culture inherited from "our" ancestors.
Space in Flux
As indicated earlier, the Indonesian public has associated the gardu with informal 
gatherings (for men) and information exchange; the gardu has also been related to 
ideologies of security, discipline, and the spectacle of power. However, an inquiry into 
the "origins" of the gardu requires that we be sensitive to the diverse functions and 
different signs it once symbolized. We must also be aware of the dependency of those 
functions and signs on changes in the social and physical environments within which 
they are embedded.
It is reasonable to believe that gardus were already in existence in Java before the 
advent of European colonialism. They could be found at the entrances to the 
compounds of the nobility or the notables (see Figure 13). However, the purpose of 
precolonial gardus was neither for demarcating territory nor for defense and exclusion. 
Instead, the point of their presence, like the conspicuous presence of the guards, was to 
show the power of the king as the center of the cosmos. For instance, the nine guarded 
gates of the Yogyakarta palace refer to the king's body (the nine "cosmic" holes of the 
king's body) rather than the territorial stretch of his kingdom.34
Figure 13. Guards protecting the kraton (palace) of Yogyakarta. Sketched by A. de Nelly, one of Johannes 
Rach's pupils, in c. 1771. Source: Peter Carey, ed., The British in Java, 1811-1816: ,4 Javanese Account
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).
34 K. P. H. Brongtodiningrat, The Royal Palace (Karaton) o f Yogyakarta: Its Architecture and Its Meaning, trans. 
R. Murdani Hadiatmaja (Yogyakarta: Karaton Museum Yogyakarta, 1975), pp. 22-23.
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Benedict Anderson, Soemarsaid Moertono, and Oliver Wolters have written about 
the absence of a concept of boundaries in the Javanese polity.35 They emphasized the 
permanent state of flux and the instability of the traditional polity. Similarly, Anthony 
Reid and J. Kathirithamby-Wells have discussed the difficulty of defining the "city" of 
Southeast Asia in terms of its boundary, since there are no clear divisions among the 
compounds outside the king's palace, as well as no explicit physical differentiation 
between what lies inside the town and what lies outside it.36
Historians of the rural politics of Java, such as Jan Breman and Onghokham, have 
discovered a similar tendency in rural areas. The domains of both the local notables 
and the peasants were not demarcated territorially. Instead, they were spread out over 
various settlements and underwent regrouping according to the prestige and the 
prosperity of the notables and the up-and-down fortunes of the agricultural producers. 
The degree of instability was intensified by the notables' constant engagement in 
competitive struggles to win the favor of higher authorities as well as the subservience 
of the peasants. The consequence of these struggles was that a notable's degree of 
success was determined not by the extent of his territory, but by the number of people 
he could draw into his circle. An extract from a survey report on a district in West Java 
dating from the end of the nineteenth century documents the reaction of the colonial 
state that couldn't abide such a state of flux:
Until the reorganization of 1870, the desa [village] boundaries were never clearly 
delineated. The desa was a conglomeration of persons, falling under the 
jurisdiction of one loerah [headman], with the consequence that, at any time, 
everyone was free to renounce their obedience to him and had the option to place 
themselves under the authority of another chief. The land, no matter where it was 
situated, always went with the person, so that there could be no question of a 
demarcated desa area: tjingtjing di mana, ngawoela ka mana soeka, "live where you 
like, serve whom you will"—is an old proverb that retained its force until 1870.37
Without going into detail concerning the political basis of rural organization in 
precolonial times (a topic that has been extensively studied), it is sufficient to say that 
the organization of the Javanese countryside, like that of its urban counterpart, was 
always in a state of flux. Had there been gardus, they would have been used 
sporadically and would never have constituted a network that would help systematize 
the notions of bondage, territory, and boundary. The idea of territorial demarcation 
and community formation defined by boundary is foreign to Java.
In what follows, I will show how the emergence of the gardu as an institution 
demarcating territorial boundaries in the Indonesian village and town is connected to 
the decline of sultanate power and the rise of the colonial West in Java. Let me start by 
discussing rural Java, the political creation of boundaries there and the establishment 
of the "village community," of which the gardu was a crucial part. The Indonesian
35 Oliver Wolters, History, Culture, and Region in Southeast Asian Perspectives (Singapore: Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, 1982); Soemarsaid Moertono, State and Statecraft in Old Java: A Study o f the Later 
Mataram Period, 16th to 19th Century (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Southeast Asia Program Publications, 1981); 
Benedict Anderson, "The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture."
36 Anthony Reid, "The Structure of Cities in Southeast Asia, 15th to 17th Centuries," Journal o f Southeast 
Asian Studies 11,2 (1980): 235-50; J. Kathirithamby-Wells, "The Islamic City: Melaka to Jogyakarta c. 1500- 
1800," Modern Asian Studies 20,2 (1986): 333-51.
37 As cited in Jan Breman, The Village on Java and the Early Colonial State, p. 36.
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principle of tolerating erratic, vaguely defined village boundaries underwent change in 
the nineteenth century as a result of Dutch colonial rule; this happened most notably 
under the rule of the French "Napoleonic" Governor General Daendels (1805-11), 
under Governor Raffles during the English Interregnum (1811-15), and during the 
period of the Cultivation System (1830-70). The intermingling of these different 
regimes of power gave rise to territorial consciousness and, as I will show, the gradual 
formation of a local attachment to the gardu. The evolution of the gardu's function was 
not driven solely by colonial discourse regarding security, but also involved the 
representation of power, territory, and identity.
Guarding the Road
The most significant change in the morphology of the Javanese town occurred 
when Herman Willem Daendels, the French governor general of the Netherlands 
Indies, ruled Java (1805—ll) .38 It is quite plausible to suggest that the gardu and its role 
in the institution of day- and nightwatch (ronda) began as a result of Daendels's orders. 
The Indonesian word “gardu" might even come from the French word “garde."39 In any 
case, Daendels was the first person to use territorial demarcation as part of a strategy 
to rule Java. He institutionalized the idea of the boundary by dividing the Dutch 
territories in Java into sharply demarcated spaces called "residencies."40 He then 
connected these residencies by a thoroughfare called the Grand Post Road (Jalan Pos 
Besar in Malay or the Groote Postweg in Dutch) in 1808, which ran across the coastal and 
inland area of Java, from the west coast of Anyer to the east coast of Banyuwangi. This 
massive construction project, which caused the deaths of thousands of Javanese forced 
laborers, stemmed from the Dutch need to improve communication between the 
"residencies," expand trade, and, perhaps most importantly, to facilitate forceful 
pacification of the uprisings in certain areas in Java.41
Peter Nas and Pratiwo have studied the historical layout of the Groote Postweg and 
its later development.42 One of the important points they have made concerns the effect 
of the thoroughfare on the urban symbolism of the Javanese town. The new road 
stretching along the island of Java, oriented east-west, disrupted or undermined the 
spatial orientation of the Javanese "town," which had traditionally been laid out on a 
north-south axis. This change of spatial orientation contributed to the undermining of
38 King Lodewijk Napoleon of France, who governed Holland, appointed Daendels.
39 H. C. C. Clockener Brousson, Batavia Awal Abad 20 (Gedenkschriften van een oud-koloniaal), trans.
Achmand Sunjayadi (Jakarta: Komunitas Bambu, 2003 [(1903-06?]), p. 121.
40 Onghokham, The Thugs, the Curtain Thief, and the Sugar Lord: Power, Politics, and Culture in Colonial Java 
(Jakarta: Metaphor Publishing, 2003), p. 161.
41 The colonial government of the twentieth century promoted the highway in this manner:
"Through the pathless forest, climbing towards the clefts left by volcanic upheaval, past inhospitable 
villages and over rivers that become raging torrents with every tropical storm, the builders pushed on to 
their goal. So well did they build that the run by motor car from Batavia to Soerabaya, a distance of 846 
kms., has been done in less than twelve hours, or an average of better than 70 kms. per hour, over roads 
that carry heavy traffic. These roads are filled from daylight to dark with natives on foot, plodding bullock 
carts, bad-tempered ponies in assorted two wheels, [sic] and that racing monster, the autobus, careering 
madly past all and sundry, its grinning sarong-clad passengers getting a thrill with every sway of the 
usually much overloaded vehicle. De Koloniale Roeping van Nederland (The Hague: Dutch-British Publishing 
Company, Limited, 1930), p. A5.
42 Peter J. M. Nas and Pratiwo, "Java and De Groote Postweg, La Grande Route, the Great Mail Road, Jalan 
Raya Pos," Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land-en Volkenkunde 158,4 (2002): 707-25.
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traditional authority throughout Java, already in decline since the eighteenth century.43 
In addition to this spatial disruption, there was also a symbolic displacement of 
Javanese authority caused by the building of the Groote Postweg. It is on this road that 
we encounter colonial gardu. As part of the transport system of the Groote Postweg, a 
series of posts, which were essentially guardhouses, were installed along the road at 
regular intervals, intended for the use of travelers needing to change horses (see Figure 
14).
Figure 14. A pendhopo guardhouse in the nineteenth century. Source: Steven Wachlin, Woodbury and Page: 
Photographers o f Java (Leiden: K1TLV, 1994). Reprinted with permission.
Steven Wachlin, the editor of the photo collection compiled by colonial 
photographers Woodbury and Page, describes the Groote Postweg in relation to the 
guardhouse in this way:
Changing horses in a pendhopo in Cisokan, on the Groote Postweg near Cianjur. 
In order to facilitate traffic, pendhopo were built every nine kilometres along the 
Groote Postweg, the Great Postroad stretching from west to east along the whole 
length of Java. Travellers rode in special carriages drawn by four to six horses,
43 What was the response of the Javanese king(s) and commoners to this change in "cosmology"? Partly as 
a result of the extension of the road network of the Groote Postweg, Prince Diponegoro decided to start the 
Java War in 1825 because he believed the road extension had violated his symbolic "sphere of influence." 
Liem Thian Joe stated in his chronicle: "Because the Dutch wanted to replace one of the Prince's residences 
with a wide street, the Prince resisted, and thus the war lasting for years erupted." Liem Thian Joe, Riwajat 
Semarang, 1416-1931 (Semarang-Batavia: BoekhandelHo Kim Yoe, 1933), p. 96.
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which were operated by entrepreneurs who obtained concessions from the 
government. A journey from Batavia to Surabaya lasted about nine days.44
The pendhopo mentioned here was functionally a gardu that adopted the 
characteristic roof shape of the pendhopo. Once attached to the housing compounds of 
the Javanese elite, the pendhopo had been displaced to the Groote Postweg. These shelters 
appeared as freestanding structures guarding the road every nine kilometers. We 
could say that the Groote Postweg pioneered the commercial use of the pendhopo and 
inaugurated the Dutch as the new authority of Java. But why was the pendhopo adopted 
for regulating the traffic of the Groote Postweg? One reason might be that the pendhopo 
was associated with "traditional" power and protection, as well as, perhaps, in the eyes 
of the Dutch, a picturesque, exotic quality because of the roof. The Groote Postweg 
appropriated the symbolism and function of the pendhopo to gain attention and 
influence in Java. By detaching the form from the body of the Javanese "royal" 
residence, the Dutch displaced the pendhopo and resurrected it as the first commercially 
administered guardhouse.
It would be valuable to find and study the public's perceptions, as well as that of 
the Javanese court, at the time of the construction of the Groote Postweg, with its 
pendhopo gardus located along the way. Late nineteenth-century European travelers 
identified the gardu of the Groote Postweg as a kind of "rest-house."45 According to one 
account by traveler E. R. Scidmore, who wrote in the 1890s: "twice we found busy 
passers-by going on in droves beside these rest-houses—picturesque gatherings of 
men, women, and children (and) the main road was crowded all the way like a city 
street, and around these passers-by the highway hummed with voices."46
Unfortunately, while the road attracted people's attention, it also invited robbers. A 
historian of Semarang, Liem Thian Joe, has indicated that robbery attempts were 
frequent along the Postweg, forcing merchants and travelers to hire martial guards to 
accompany them on their journey.47 While the road posed these dangers to travelers, it 
was still widely used and became a focus for the inhabitants around the area. The 
thoroughfare and its pendhopo reoriented the patterns of settlements and the 
subjectivity of the populace along its way. A new center, in the form of a road, one 
fraught with anxiety and providing a new form of mobility, was thus created, 
challenging the centrality of the sultan's court. Perhaps, within this context, travelers 
saw "rows of open houses on each side of the highway"48 and "along every bit of the 
road were posted the names of the kampungs and estates charged to maintain the 
highway in perfect condition."49 With security at stake, a routine of watches (ronda) 
was first institutionalized to guard both the kampungs and the estates, as well as to help 
provide security for the Postweg. Henri C. C. C. Brousson perhaps was right when he 
theorized that the French “garde" was transformed eventually into the Indonesian
44 Steven Wachlin (with a contribution by Marianne Fluitsma and Gerrit Knaap), Woodbury and Page: 
Photographers of Java (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1994), p. 81.
45 Soon hotels were built adjacent to the locations of the "rest-houses." For example, one of the first hotels 
in the Indies, Hotel Preanger in Bandung, was built next to one of these rest houses.
46 E. R. Scidmore, Java, the Garden of the East (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1984 [orig. New York:
The Century Company, 1899]), p. 176.
47 Liem, Riwajat Semarang, p. 99.
48 Scidmore, Java, the Garden of the East, p. 179.
49 Ibid., p. 176.
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word “gardu" (rumah jaga, the guardhouse), an unconscious tribute to Daendels's role 
in the history of the guardhouse.
The "Village Community"
The English interregnum (1811-1815), while brief, contributed a great deal to the 
formation of territorial consciousness and boundary policing, for it introduced a tax 
system based on landholding, a practice that had never been a tradition in Java. The 
land-based tax system, appropriated perhaps from British India, required a 
concentrated and permanently settled population. At the very least, the mobility of the 
population would have to be calculated and each member of the settlement 
registered.50 The need to secure peace and order along the Postweg was thus extended 
to the state's impulse to patrol the movement of people in and out the registered land. 
Along with this, a master plan was made to group the scattered homesteads into 
concentrated settlements. In his study of rural West Java, Breman helpfully included 
the master plan, which deserves a closer look.
Figure 15 (below) shows "the plan of a desa as it presently exists." There is no clear 
boundary or territorial demarcation on which one could base an argument for a 
"village community." The houses are scattered, connected by unconfigured pathways. 
In contrast, Figure 16 gives us a master plan that shows the layout of a new village, 
fenced off, with one guarded entrance from the main street.51 The existing layout of the 
new village was fully altered to achieve the geometrical order or a disciplinary space 
with a clear point of entry and exit for the purpose of surveillance. One could argue 
that the gardu at the entrance from the main street provided coherence for the "village 
community.
This systematization of rural community reached its peak after the Java War (1825- 
1830) in the form of state plantations operated under what is now known as the Dutch 
Cultivation System (1830-1870). Onghokham indicates that, by then, for the first time, 
"the whole of Java was divided into villages, each with its own territory, and one 
bordering on another, so that there was no administrative vacuum in Java."52 This 
colonial state plantation system brought together scattered settlements and formed 
what we know today as the "village community."53 This plantation system resulted in 
the organization of boundaries sustained ultimately by a network of gardu (see Figure 
17, below).
50 In Breman's words, "each new arrival or departure had to be reported immediately and in detail to the 
district head." See Jan Breman, The Village on Java and the Early-Colonial State, p. 40.
51 Breman, The Village on Java and the Early-Colonial State, p. 40.
52 Onghokham, The Thugs, the Curtain Thief, and the Sugar Eord, p. 126.
53 Ibid.
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Figures 15 and 16: "The plan of a desa as it presently exists" with a gardu only for the house of the notable; 
and the "Plan of the new establishment in a desa" with a gardu for the whole village community. 
Source: Jan Breman, The Village on Java and the Early-Colonial State (Rotterdam: CASP, 1980).
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Figure 17: A colorful drawing of what seems to be a utopian space with a gardll at the entrance to a gated 
community of a desa. Source: J.C. Lamster, Java: Eerste Deel 
(Haerlem: Uitgave N.V. Droste's Cacao-En Chocoladefabrieken, 1934).
With the creation of the "gated community" came the idea of insiders and 
outsiders: the normal and the pathological. In Hikayat Siti Mariah, a romantic novel 
written in 1910-12 about a semi-village life in the late nineteenth century, the author, 
Haji Mukti, began his story with a kampung guard shouting from a gardu, "Hordal" 
(from the Dutch wier daar, meaning "who is that?"), which was answered from the 
other side, “PrinV (friend!). By securing a space and introducing a guard trained to call 
out a standard challenge to all who approached, this system established a disciplinary 
procedure to identify those who were not recognized as "friends" of the community. 
With the establishment of the gardu and "village community," the state was finally able 
to identify and define the "wandering class."
They are not to be depended upon. They left often for the most trivial of reasons 
and just as unexpectedly as they had come. Their number remained consistently 
unstable and uncertain. These roving folk usually had a lower moral standard 
than the settled population. It has been said of them that they found their greatest 
delight in "gaming, the seductive dancing girl and poisonous opium."54 *
Once physical space has been firmly delineated, the establishment of knowledge and 
power can proceed with more clarity. By this time, the government had already found 
a tool to cope with the increasing appearance in 1870s of the "wandering class" and the 
activities of the organized keen (rural thugs) who "disturbed" the order and peace of 
the villages. Dutch Resident Zoutelief, who controlled the residency of Surakarta, 
Central Java, had already instituted a ronda and established a "gated community" that 
could be made to "close the door to the village compound."5"
54 Burger, 1975, as cited in Breman, The Village on Java and the Early-Colonial State, p. 41.
’’Suhartono, Apanage dan Bengkel: Perubahan Sosial diPedesaan Surakarta 1830-1920 (Yogyakarta: PT Tiara 
Wacana Yogya, 1991), p. 157.
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While the Dutch colonials were clearly "seeing like a state,"56 it would be 
misleading to think that they had a complete hold on the everyday governance of the 
Javanese village and town. On the contrary, the colonial state did not monopolize 
control of social life, nor did it impose a standardized law applicable to everyone 
under its authority. Instead, the colonial state allowed local authorities substantial 
power to rule and govern as long as the interests of the state were not compromised. 
Onghokham has written about this division of power, established by the Dutch to 
"indirectly" manage Java through the state plantation system. Onghokham shows how 
the Dutch, after taking over Java in 1830, delegated authority to the native regents 
(bupati, local lords) who organized thugs, known as jago, to maintain order and 
security in both rural and urban Java.57 This hierarchy of power is known to historians 
as the Dutch dualistic principle for organizing its colony.58 For members of these 
colonial "plural societies," the gardu could be seen as a symbol of local autonomy, even 
as through these guardhouses were tied to the politics of the colonial state. The 
territorial demarcation and the dualistic power hierarchy introduced by European 
power could thus be said to have given rise to a tradition of gardu.
Observers recognized that the Javanese had begun to accept and adapt the gardu to 
serve their own purposes. As Europeans in the last half of the nineteenth century 
became increasingly fascinated by the culture and civilization of Java, the gardu were 
portrayed as the expression of Javanese culture—an object both of menace and desire 
(see Figure 18, below). They became an object of study for scholars and bureaucrats. 
For instance, in 1893, a long article was devoted to the study of gardu. Its author, H. A. 
de Groot, discussed gardu (wachthuizen, in Dutch) in relation to the possibility of 
establishing a police system in the colony. The context for this sort of discussion of 
gardu was a profound sense of insecurity created by kecu in the villages and peri-urban 
centers of Java.59 In a way, we could say that the establishment of gardu throughout 
Indonesia was an imperfect compromise adopted by a colonial state reluctant to 
impose a more overarching system of policing on the country. If the colonial state had 
instituted a unified security system, is it possible the neighborhood gardu would have 
never come into existence?
In this section, I have tried to outline the ways in which the gardu came to be 
formed as a product of the colonial state's spatial politics. To explain how the gardu 
came to be imagined by the Javanese as a cultural tradition representing the local 
community of Java, we must (re)turn to the city and examine the discourse of security 
during the radical "age in motion" and the concomitant formation of an overarching 
police system.60
56 James Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve Human Conditions Have Failed (New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998).
57 Onghokham, The Thugs, The Curtain Thief, and the Sugar Lord, pp. 10-15,113-145; see also Henk Schulte 
Nordholt and Margreet van Till, "Colonial Criminals in Java," in Figures of Criminality in Indonesia, the 
Philippines, and Colonial Vietnam, ed. Vicente Rafael (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Southeast Asia Program, 1999), 
pp. 47-69.
58 J. A. S. Furnivall, Colonial Policy and Practice: A Comparative Study of Burma and Netherlands India 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1948).
59 H. A. de Groot, "De uitoefening der politie op Java III. De wachthuizen," De Iocomotief (December 20, 
1893).
60 See Takashi Shiraishi, An Age in Motion: Popular Radicalism in Java, 1912-1926 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1990).
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Figure 18: An exotic depiction of members of a gardu and their instruments.
Source: A. van Pers and J. C. Hageman, Nederlimdsch ( )ost-Indische typen (s'Gravenhage: Mieling, 1856).
Urban Radicalism and the Police Station
In the photo album of Woodbury and Page, a gardu is shown standing in a 
prominent place in the Meester Cornells neighborhood, at that time an intermediate 
area between the city and the country (see Figure 19, below). The gardu was made of 
permanent building materials, carefully crafted to appear like a monument, and sited 
like a monument, so it could be seen, unobstructed, from a distance. Evidence indicates 
that gardu were prominently represented in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century urban centers of Java.61 Like Woodbury and Page, H. C. C. Clockener 
Brousson, a journalist who lived at the turn of the century, was impressed during his 
trip to Batavia by the "gardu that were placed at a regular interval along the street
61 For this period, Marieke Bloembergen has kindly offered the following Dutch references for those who 
are interested in investigating the printed sources on gardu. See W. Boekhoudt, Rapport reorganisatie van het 
politiewezen op lava en A ladoera (Uitgezonderd de vorstenlanden, de particuliere landerijen en de hoofdplaatsen 
Batavia, .8,■waning en Soerabaia) 1900 07 (Batavia: Landsdrukkerij, 1908); H. A. de Groot, "De uitoefening 
der politie op Java III. De wachthuizen," De Locomotief (December 20,1893); C. Lulofs, 
"Nachtwakerskorpsen," Tijdschrift poor Iwt Binnenlandsch Bestuur 47 (1914): 207-214; Reg. Tjaa. Mees, "Het 
recht en de politie bij de inlandsche bevolking op Java en Madoera, zooals daarvan gebleeken is uit het 
ingestelde onderzoek naar hare mindere welvaart,"( trgaan der vereeniging Moederland en Kolonien 10,1 
(1910): 13-46.
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where people lived."'12 By the early twentieth century, the imagined unity of a "village 
community," the image of gardu, had been fully materialized in the city.
Figure 19: One of a series o f  gardu on the road between Weltevreden, in Batavia, and Meester Cornells, 
before 1880. Source: K1TLV. Reprinted with permission.
As far as the function of the gardu is concerned, the routines in the villages and in 
the city were similar. The colonial state allowed non-Europeans in urban centers, as in 
rural areas, to maintain the security of their own quarters. What is significant about the 
city, however, is that the urban center consisted of people from various ethnic 
backgrounds. The powerful colonial institution responded to this multiplicity of 
cultures by preserving racial privileges and segregation, even though unofficial and 
loosely integrated ethnic clusters had already been formed before Europeans came to 
the archipelago. The different population groups thus lived more or less separated 
from each other in town, divided according to colonial ethnic classifications.62 3
Before the emergence of the city police (which I will discuss below), the Dutch 
"protected" the people of the Indies by delegating power to the elites of the ethnic 
groups who often hired urban thugs to safeguard their quarters in strategically placed 
gardus. The Chinese quarter thus had its own head and security guards, as did the
62 Brousson, Batavia Awal Abad 20, p. 120.
63 In discussing the formation of spatial boundaries and the establishment of legal distinctions, we are also 
talking about the privileged group imposing power on others through legal restrictions. While different 
ethnic groups were asked to maintain their own legal systems, the colonial state also imposed restrictions 
on those groups and their mobility. For instance, the subsequent imposition of a "passport regulation" 
(passenstelsd, 1821-1906), a "residential regulation" (wijkenstelsel, 1841-1915), and the politieirol (a law 
empowering the police to enforce these other restrictions, 1848-191Os) had contributed much to the 
emergence of the "Kampong Cina" (Chinese camp). See Mona Lohanda, Growing Pains: The Chinese and the 
Dutch in Colonial Java, 11190-1942 (Jakarta: Yayasan Cipta Loka Caraka, 2002), pp. 36-48.
Guardian of Memories 125
indigenous kampung. The European neighborhoods also had their own gardus 
organized by the local governors. The formation of urban gardu was thus connected to 
the segregation of colonial space, which divided the city into the European enclave, the 
Chinese Kampung, the Kampung for Arabs, the Kampung for Malays (Melayu), and 
Kampung Keling for Indians, among others. With the gardu, each quarter organized its 
own day- and nightwatch schemes. The nightwatch was the basic form of security for 
the segregated neighborhoods in the urban center.
One important characteristic of neighborhood security as embodied in the gardu 
was its passivity as a form of defense. The watchmen tended to remain in the gardu or 
patrol around their compound equipped with the kentongan, a bell-like instrument. 
They would not patrol the streets beyond the designated territory of a kampung.64 
However, by the early twentieth century, this rather passive form of security watch 
was considered outdated. As Java experienced the popular urban radicalism that 
characterized this "age in motion," residents began to feel their neighborhoods were 
endangered.65 Different security measures were deemed necessary. The newly 
established city government issued an instruction that the gardu system was to be 
replaced by a centralized police system.66 Significantly, this police force would patrol 
the streets surrounding the kampung.
This initiative was prompted by several developments. The most important factor 
was the increasing number of European families residing in the colony's urban centers, 
many of whom felt unusually insecure as a result of unrest in the cities. Meanwhile, the 
growth of the urban population had blurred the distance between the safe European 
enclave and the "native" kampung. The task of the twentieth-century police was to 
maintain the city as a safe haven for Europeans. The lack of safety, as historian Marieke 
Bloembergen points out, was "a specifically European problem."67
The first systematically organized city police unit was formed in 1914. The number 
of recruits considered necessary to safeguard the city increased each year, with 
European recruits installed in the top rank and Indonesians at the subordinate level. In 
Surabaya alone, as Bloembergen indicates, the number of police was increased from 
297 members in 1905 to a total of 1358 in 1917.68 In 1918, the Dutch colonial
64 We can see the effect of this gardu system in Haji Mukti's novel, Hikayat Siti Mariah. See Haji Mukti, 
Hikayat Siti Mariah, ed. Pramoedya Ananta Toer (Jakarta: Lentera Dipantara, 2003). What is peculiar about 
this story is that it represented the Cultivation System era as a time of peace and order. No reference is 
made to the fact that the exploitative era was marked by social unrest, banditry, and an unprecedented 
sense of insecurity, especially among the European communities. The novel's only indication that 
conditions were unstable is its portrayal of the nightwatch and the gardu. The story apparently takes place 
inside a "European" kampung under the watch of the gardu. Little information is offered about the streets 
beyond that community.
65 Mr. A. N. de W., "Hal Polisi," in Kitab Peringatan oentoek Hindia Belanda ketika S.B. Maharadja Poeteri 
tjoekoep 25 tahoen bertachta keradjaan, 1898-1923 (Batavia: G. Kolff and Co., 1923), p. 109.
66 Marieke Bloembergen indicates that in Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, Arsip Binnenlands bestuur, 
BB 3540, one can find information concerning "Java-wide research on the possibility to dispose of the
gar doe and ronda services (1924), also a short report on the outer province (1927)"; BB 3539, idem, including 
the Outer Provinces, 1928-1933.
67 Marieke Blombergen, "Between Public Safety and Political Control: Modern Colonial Policing in 
Surabaya (1911-1919)" (paper presented at the First International Conference on Urban History,
University of Airlangga and Netherlands Institute for War Documentation, Surabaya, August 23-25, 2004), 
P- 3-
68 Ibid., p. 7. Prior to 1914, the police forces were relatively neglected, insignificant, and unorganized. For a 
brief report on the development of police forces, see Mr. A. N. de W., "Hal Polisi."
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government, alerted by "the rise of (political) consciousness of the people in Java 
following their counterparts in East Aha." expanded the security measures to reach 
the outskirts of the big cities. Soon, some three thousand civilians (including 
Indonesians) had been recruited and trained as field police (veldpolisi) to safeguard the 
outer perimeters of Java's largest cities. These professional police "spoke the native 
language and understood local culture, but they were not allowed to police the areas 
where they were originally from."69 70 The decision to post police recruits far from their 
homes had an important consequence discussed below, but here let me just note that 
the policy created a distance between the police and the community.
As far as methods of security are concerned, what seems to have been new in the 
early twentieth century was the visibility of police on the streets, a display that was 
deemed necessary to the success of street surveillance. During this era, police houses 
(politie posthuis) were built in strategic nodes encompassing different neighborhoods, 
with a concentration in the European neighborhoods and around European businesses, 
as one might expect. In the beginning, the police houses resembled the village's gardu, 
but unlike the watchman occupying the gardu, the policemen distinguished themselves 
by wearing uniforms (see Figure 20).
Figure 20: City police in uniform in a semi-permanent guardhouse (Posthuizen) after 1914. Source: G. H. 
vonFaber, Nieuw Soerabaia (Soerabaja: Uitgave N.V. Boekhandel en Drukkerij H. van Ingen, 1934).
Soon, the police had fully emancipated themselves from the world of the 
watchman by occupying office-like buildings. This type of building was placed at 
strategic locations related to European interests, such as near the post office (posthuis),
69 Mr. A. N. de W., "Flal Polisi," pp. 108-09. One could also make a connection between the reform of the 
police as an institution in 1914 and the subsequent abolition of the policy on spatial segregation in 1919.
70 Ibid., p. 109.
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government buildings, and large private offices (see Figure 21).71 At first, the new 
politie was expected to be able to replace the gardu and ronda, and in fact orders were 
given to remove the gardu.'2 Yet, this plan to centralize urban security systems under 
the watch of the police was never fulfilled. Many factors might have been behind the 
failure of the colonial state to impose unified security measures. Economic and 
financial constraints were obviously of fundamental importance, but one of the crucial 
reasons, I think, was that by the turn of the century, the colonized citizenry (inspired 
by the volatile "age in motion") had begun to identify with the gardu as a symbol of 
their culture, one that could be mobilized to challenge the authority of the state's 
police. The gardu thus continued to exist. It remained a local institution, but one that 
had become somewhat hostile, at least symbolically, to the "national" police.
Figure 21: A politic posthuis after 1914. Source: G. H. von Faber, Nieuw Soerabaia.
Since the emergence of the new police forces, the gardu were increasingly perceived 
by Javanese socio-political organizations, such as the Syarikat Islam (SI), as a symbol of 
local power, one that could be mobilized to represent resistance to the colonial state. 
Marieke Bloembergen describes how the Syarikat Islam installed several gardus to 
guarantee the safety of the workers in Surabaya when the latter were engaged in a 
dispute over revenue with a landowner. For the members of the SI, the installation of 
the gardu was both functional and symbolic. The organization regarded gardus as 
providing not only public safety and support for the underprivileged, but also 
challenging the authority of the new police and consolidating power for their 
organization. The staging of gardu could be seen as a sign of Si's support for workers in 
Surabaya. Though such gardu were considered "illegal" by the colonial state,73 the SI
' 1 Ibid., p. 108.
72 Blombergen, "Between Public Safety and Political Control," p. 7.
73 Ibid., p. 16.
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nevertheless continued the practice. This use of the gardu by SI clearly foreshadows 
Megawati's use of the posko years later.
The gardu in this context reflects competing claims for authority, but it also 
expresses the sense of the colonial society from which it derives meaning. Yet, the 
meaning of the gardu changes constantly as it moves across different social 
environments. What I have tried to indicate in this section is the process by which the 
gardu came to be conceived as an element in the colonial security apparatus and then 
appropriated by the Javanese. I have also indicated the "new-ness" of this supposedly 
old practice. Only at the turn of the century, then, did the gardu find its territorial 
"community" and come to be imagined as "local tradition." Under the Ethical Policy at 
the beginning of the twentieth century, this "village-urban community," along with its 
ethos of mutual help (gotong rojong) and its institution of ronda, was promoted by 
Dutch scholars and the Javanese elite as the archetype of Javanese tradition. The 
Japanese military administration (as we will see later) would reconstruct its own 
version of the neighborhood association in Indonesia and extend its control through 
that means.
The Chinese Experience
In the discourse involving Indonesian gardu, the experiences of ethnic Chinese are 
of particular interest and importance, largely because discussions of the gardu's 
significance have presented it as either a Dutch-colonial institution or as the cultural 
property of the Javanese. But the gardu has also had a specific meaning and history for 
the ethnic Chinese community. In the first place, the ethnic Chinese have been 
implicated in social unrest and subjected to attack since (if not before) the early 
formation of colonial power. Their continuous experience as a customary target must 
have motivated them to come up with coping strategies, and it is likely these strategies 
contributed to the multiplication of Indonesian gardu. It is also possible that Chinese 
ethnic traditions influenced the shape of some of Indonesia's earliest gardu, for gates, 
walls, and guards have always been endemic to the Chinese townscape. If Denys 
Lombard is right, we might want to consider his suggestion that the traditional 
Chinese defense routine based on a neighborhood watch system, known as the Pao Tjia 
system (said to be invented around the tenth century), could have been implemented 
by ethnic Chinese in Java's coastal area long before the arrival of Europeans.74
In any case, let me make a start by considering the ethnic Chinese experiences of 
spatial segregation in colonial cities. We have seen that colonial spatial divisions, 
drawn along ethnic lines, segregated the urban landscape, but we have not discussed 
how such segregation encouraged each neighborhood's defense of its space, which in 
turn contributed to the formation of the "ethnic" communities.75 The practice of placing
74 Denys Lombard, Nusa Jawa: Silang Budaya II: Jaringan Asia, (Jakarta: Gramedia, 1996), p. 278.
75 The pass system created an identification card for the ethnic Chinese, and the residential rule fixed their 
spatial identity. The residential rules (wijkenstelsel) gathered the ethnic Chinese, who previously had been 
scattered throughout various places, into one kampung in each urban area and decreed they would need to 
obtain passes to travel outside their own kampungs. These two regulations were enforced by politieirol, a 
law that gave the police chief unlimited power to punish without trial those who were considered to have 
violated the passport and residential systems. Liem Thian Joe described the process of identity formation 
through spatial and legal segregation in a way that calls to mind the difficulties people encountered 
attempting to secure visas into the United States and Europe after September 11: "To obtain a pass, the
Guardian of Memories 129
communities in ethnic ghettos had prepared the ground for the tactics of self-defense, 
such as barricading the segregated space with gardu at the gate in order to defend 
oneself against the chaos of riots and wars.
Liem Thian Joe, the chronicler of the city of Semarang, points out that "matters 
concerning guards [djaga] and guardhouses [gardoe] began during the era of the 
Company [the Dutch East India Company]."76 The first institutionalized racial 
segregation of space in the Dutch East Indies indeed took place after the massacre of 
the Chinese in 1740, a result of fierce competition for trade and land in developing 
Batavia. Initially there had been an area, known today as Glodok, set aside for the 
Chinese people.77 Liem indicated that in 1741, a year after the massacre of the Chinese 
in Batavia, the Chinese in Semarang decided to build a barricade around their 
neighborhood.78 They "built betengan [barricades] made of strong timbers and boards 
in front of Chinese kampongs, which during that time were clusters of open space 
surrounded by rivers ... Headed by the Kapiten, the Chinese populace patrolled the 
barricades day and night."79 From this same bulwark of resistance, the Chinese in 
Semarang eventually waged war against Dutch East Indies forces, with the help of 
ethnic Chinese mobilized from other regions. This event was clearly significant and the 
method of defense unprecedented, as the local populace remembered the whole 
barricaded area as a bastion (betengan, in Malay, or pan[g]-shia, in Fukianese).80
By the nineteenth century, the ethnic Chinese in Java had learned that they would 
be a customary target in any conflict involving Dutch authority and the sultans of Java. 
Since that time, barricades, gates, and guardhouses—some perhaps modeled after 
traditional Chinese village fortifications—became permanent features of the Chinese 
quarters. A rumor of conflict would be sufficient to generate an alert and create a sense 
of threat and uncertainty. One report describes the cloud of rumors stirred up by the 
war between Prince Diponegoro and the Dutch in 1825:
person has to meet the Chinese kapitan (or the head of his district appointed by the Dutch). He has to 
inform him where he is going, with what transportation, with whom, and how long he will be staying. He 
has to pay several fees to every officer who processes his paper work (from the officer down to the clerk). 
Upon his arrival, he has to report to the officer of the place. There are various kinds of passes: The road 
pass is for going from one place to another; the market pass is for selling objects (the items of which also 
have to be registered) in the market; the village pass is for going to the fields to obtain agricultural goods. 
Later, when photography is introduced, those who obtain the market and village passes will have their 
pictures on the cards. There is also a year pass for merchants to go from one place to another. To go from 
one city to another, such as from Semarang to Soerakarta or Djokjakarta, one has to apply one month in 
advance, and again he has to specify the purpose of the trip, to whose house he is going, with whom and 
on what transportation. And of course, to pay for the stamp and the clerk." Liem Thian Joe, Riwajat 
Semarang, pp. 87-88.
76 Liem, Riwajat Semarang, p. 109. Perhaps Liem was referring to the great, stone-walled castle of Batavia, 
reputedly built in 1619 by the Dutch East Indian Company, which was equipped with a watchtower and 
guardhouses. The concern of this paper is more on the origin and spread of guardhouses in the non- 
European quarters.
77 Leonard Blusse, "Batavia, 1619-1940: The Rise and Fall of a Chinese Colonial Town," Journal of Southeast 
Asian Studies, 12 (1981): 159-78.
78 According to Liem, before this time the Chinese in Semarang marked their territories by placing 
temples, statues of the earth deities (Thaw Tee Kong, a local/indigenous deity refashioned in Chinese style), 
and inscriptions of Buddhist sayings for peace (such as "Lam Boe O Mie Too Hoet Kiat An") at the entrances 
to their kampungs. Liem, Riwajat Semarang, p. 60.
79 Ibid., pp. 33-34.
80 Ibid., p. 34.
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... the rumors [kabar-kabar angin] spread in Semarang. Some say that one of the 
[Javanese] kings is fighting against the Dutch government; others believe that the 
latter is having a war with a foreign country. Quite a few think that thousands of 
bandits have been raiding everywhere. All these have created confusion in 
Semarang.8'
In response to these "rumors," Chinese communities in Semarang constructed gates 
and gardus around their kampung.
The gate was made so strong. It was reinforced on its two sides by a very thick 
wall, so it would be very difficult to break in. It closed at dark. Every night, 
grownups guarded the gates. Inside the gates, women and children are moved to 
the temple from where everyone will fight to the end. For months, the gates were 
guarded every night, for dangers might come unexpectedly.81 2
Figure 22: A guard at the entrance to a Chinese kampung in Semarang, date not specified.
Photo: Tan Tat Hin. Source: Liem Thian Joe, Riwajat Setnarang, 1933.
These gates were left intact after the war (1830), for "who knows, if the 'gegeran' 
[turmoil] returns, the gates will provide security for the Chinese kampong,"83 Liem 
reported that, by the 1840s, the practice of conducting ronda had been established, with
81 Ibid., p. 91. According to Liem, it took several months for people in Semarang to realize that Prince 
Diponegoro was conducting a war against the Dutch government. This event was known as "gegeran 
Diponegoro" (the shocking action of Diponegoro). Even though Semarang was not damaged by the war, 
the effects of living in worry and confusion were deep enough to make many Semarang residents 
(regardless of their ethnicities) name their children "Geger" (shocking).
82 Ibid., p. 92.
83 Liem, Riwajat Semarang, p. 96.
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one chief heading each kampung. The chief of the nightwatch was called kepala tontong 
(the head of "tontong," the instrument that produces a sound when struck with a 
wooden stick). By this time, the Chinese community in Semarang had also 
incorporated several words into the technical vocabulary associated with ronda in the 
village, including the exclamations quoted in Mukti's novel: Horde and 1/rend.
A gardoe and a kentongan are required at a junction or entrance to a street [moeloet 
jalan] or a village [moeloet doesoen]. Every Chinese man who lives in the city, as 
well as in smaller places, cannot escape from patrolling at night. Those who 
cannot fulfill this obligation are allowed to hire a substitute. Every gardoe is 
required to have two guards: one watches from evening to 1 am; and the other 
from that time until morning. They are not there just to watch, but they also 
move around the neighborhood [ronda] with a special weapon. If there is a 
killing, the guard will strike three times on the kentongan he brings with him; if 
there is a fire, he has to strike four times so that everyone knows where the 
danger is. If he sees anyone (especially strangers) after 9 pm, he has to shout: 
"who is there?" The person then ought to reply: “vrend" [friend]. Otherwise the 
guard has the right to catch and bring the suspicious person to the police.84
The fact that Liem's Riwajat Semarang was filled with stories about guarding and 
the gardu is not surprising, given the continuous experience of violence against the 
ethnic Chinese in the urban history of Java, especially since the eighteenth century. It is 
much less clear how other quarters shared the experience of guardhouses in their 
respective communities.85 It is also not clear whether the nightwatch scheme was first 
practiced in eighteenth-century urban Chinese neighborhoods, then exported to the 
villages by the colonial state before being imported back to the urban centers. In any 
case, the history of gardu in Indonesia is intimately connected to the experiences and 
collective memories of the ethnic Chinese and their responses to threat.
In the following section, I pick up the account of Kwee Thiam Tjing, an ethnic 
Chinese journalist who volunteered as a city guard (stadswacht) during the Indonesian 
era of "revolution."86 Kwee's account is instructive, for it shows us again how matters 
concerning guarding and gardus are inextricably bound to the experiences of ethnic 
Chinese, even as this community approached the era of "decolonization." Kwee also 
shows how his impressions as an observer and participant in Indonesia dalem Api dan 
Bara (Indonesia on Embers and Fire) owed everything to his experience as the guard of 
the city.
Guarding in "Indonesia dalem Api dan Bara"
On the eve of the Japanese Occupation, the Dutch, desperate for manpower to 
defend the Indies, promoted a program that sought to train civilians who would like to
84 Ibid., pp. 108-09.
85 So far, I have only found sources that talk with focused interest about gates and gardus from the 
perspective of the ethnic Chinese; Liem's account of Semarang is one example. Yet there must be sources 
that describe perceptions of guardhouses by members of other communities.
86 Kwee Thiam Tjing had his account published under a pseudonym, Tjamboek Berdoeri, Indonesia dalem 
Api dan Bara (Malang: n.p., 1947). I am using this version for reference. The book was republished in 2004 
by Elkasa Jakarta with an illuminating introduction by Benedict Anderson discussing the author and his 
time.
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volunteer as city guards (stadswacht). This proved to be the first mobilization of 
civilians by the colonial state to safeguard Indonesia's cities. The Chinese Indonesian 
journalist, Kwee Thiam Tjing, volunteered to become a guard in Malang, where he 
lived; later he would report his experiences in a remarkable book titled Indonesia dalem 
Api dan Bara. Kwee used the term wacht (from the Dutch wachthuis, watchhouse), rather 
than gardu, to refer to his post. This in itself indicates to us a conceptual and political 
difference between the meaning and practice of gardu (with its local associations) and 
the stadswacht (a city-guard program initiated by the colonial state). The imagery of 
guarding and guardhouse occupies a substantial place in his book. We could even say 
that Kwee's subjectivity was partially formed and transformed by his position as a 
guard of the city.
From the beginning of the book, Kwee illustrates the power of guardhouses to 
affect consciousness. When he volunteered to guard the city, he saw guardhouses 
(wacht-wacht) everywhere, "at the junction of various streets, especially those on the 
way to the city."87 Significantly, he perceived these fortifications and the presence of 
guards like him not as proof of the regime's strength, but as evidence that the Dutch 
regime was collapsing. He knew that the training of the city guards and the 
proliferation of guardhouses on the eve of Japanese occupation were last-ditch 
attempts by the Dutch to display their authority by mobilizing colonial subjects to 
defend their own "motherland." Yet the more guardhouses and guards Kwee saw 
around him, the more hopeless he felt, for no one, not even the most ignorant residents 
of Indonesia, respected or felt themselves protected or empowered by these defenses. 
Kwee felt that, even though he had been equipped with all kinds of military protocols, 
uniforms, and weaponry and stationed in a guardhouse, no one seemed to respect his 
profession, no matter how hard he tried to fulfill his duties. "Our rifle is created to be 
mute. The only order we were given is to remain calm, calm, and calm like Buddha 
when he was in Nirvana ... the passerby could have put some flowers down and 
burned incense for us."88 At the guardhouse, Kwee and his fellows were even bullied 
by children and mocked by adults who thought that the Dutch had already lost their 
grip on the country.
While we are sitting at our guardhouse [wacht], a group of Indonesians walk in 
our direction. From their clothes and manner, we know they are from the village. 
As they get closer to our guardhouse, one of them asks his friend, following the 
style of villagers talking in such a loud voice that everyone on the street can hear, 
-  "Brother, what are they doing?" "Don't worry! They are just Dutch soldiers 
[serdadu Londo]\ What else could they do? The Dutch have already lost!" They talk 
just like that, while passing in front of us as if we are not there. They think we are 
just like wind.89
Deprived of its enabling political networks, the symbolic authority of the guardhouse 
disappeared. Yet, Kwee Thiam Tjing illustrates how the power of the guardhouse was 
defined not only by its appearance, but, more importantly, by how it defined his 
identity and the social relations within which he and his fellow guards are embedded.
87 Kwee, Indonesia dalem Api dan Bara, p. 65
88 Ibid., pp. 65-66.
89 Ibid., p. 68.
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Indonesia dalem Bara dan Api starts with the experience of Kwee as a city guard 
volunteer, even though he is never fully convinced that his efforts will help prop up 
the crumbling regime. Nevertheless, his job as the guard of the city allows him to 
construct his subject position as someone who is both observing and participating in 
the transformation of his hometown. As Kwee witnesses the unfolding events in 
Malang, his vision owes much to his situation as an appointed observer, who is better 
positioned than most to see what his fellow Indonesians are doing to each other. No 
wonder he starts his account by discussing his experience as a guard and ends with his 
eventual sense of failure to become one.
At a deeper level, Kwee Thiam Tjing communicates the profound ambivalence of 
the ethnic Chinese's attitude towards gardu and the whole practice of guarding. The 
gardu is a structure that members of ethnic Chinese communities have relied upon, 
especially during volatile periods, even while worrying about their dependency on 
these defenses. By volunteering as a city guard, Kwee was, in fact, attempting to 
conquer such fear, for he moved beyond the standard form of community defense 
associated with the Chinese neighborhood, as described by Liem Thian Joe of 
Semarang. Kwee could have helped organize a neighborhood watch for the ethnic 
Chinese by creating betengan or phangshia around Chinese neighborhoods in Malang, 
but he chose instead to commit himself to help protect a larger entity: the whole city. 
But Indonesia dalem Api dan Bara shows precisely the danger and horror of such a 
commitment to broader civic responsibility. In the end, Kwee went back to his own 
neighborhood and found no one at home. After an intense search, he discovered the 
killing field at Mergosono and the remains of many ethnic Chinese, including his 
friends and family members who had been brutally murdered by the Indonesian mobs 
(the Djamino and Djoliteng), which wreaked havoc under the guise of revolutionary 
pemuda.
At that time, my heart was in terrible pain, and I was mad with anger. I left the 
Ang Hien Hoo (one of the Chinese associations which did not seem to care what 
had happened), and went to the [Dutch] Troepen Commandent. I told him that I 
was an ex-city guard [stadswacht\, and I would like to be a volunteer (again) to 
mobilize friends to find the killers. I asked him to lend me the weapons, and said 
I will carry out the revenge. I don't need to be paid. I don't mind if I die, for I am 
doing this for my Chinese [Tionghoa] community ...90
Indonesia dalem Bara dan Api is a story haunted by the narrator's sense of horror, 
disappointment, and guilt that he, as a guard (trained by the supposedly powerful 
colonial state and committed to safeguard the city), could not stop the massacre of 
persons from his own community. Ultimately, he discovers that he did not know 
whom he ought to guard against. The enemy was both internal and external. Guarding 
and failing to guard haunt the pages of Indonesia dalem Bara dan Api. Positioned on a 
changeable boundary line, Kwee saw himself as the guardian of human conscience 
who witnessed the helplessness of humanity to defend itself against the brutality of the 
mobs aroused by this era of profound and rapid change (zaman pantjaroba).
90 Ibid., p. 221.
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3. Retrievals
Since we have now traced the ways in which the guardhouse was constituted 
under Dutch colonialism and how it evolved and was perceived in the Chinese 
community, it is no longer possible to say that the gardu was a product of one culture. 
Nor was it monopolized by one culture, for many different groups in Indonesia made 
use of the gardu and organized their own ronda. The Dutch and the Chinese played a 
decisive and historic role in the history of this institution, but the Japanese were 
perhaps as influential. In this section, I will show how, under the Japanese Occupation, 
the gardu and the neighborhood watch came to be recognized as Indonesian cultural 
traditions, significant elements in "our" cultural heritage. Discourses concerning the 
gardu and its perceived status as a Javanese institution cannot be grasped without 
understanding the impact that the Japanese Occupation had on postcolonial political 
elites as well as the Indonesian public.
Japan Incorporated
Towards the end of the Asia Pacific War, Mohamad Hatta, the first vice president 
of Indonesia, remarked:
What matters above all other benefits [introduced by the Japanese Occupation] is 
that people's minds have been liberated from their sense of inferiority. In contrast 
to the Dutch, the Imperial army [of Japan] has taught us to be brave and to 
recognize ourselves on our own merits.91
The Japanese military administration in Indonesia, while only lasting for three and 
a half years, was significant for its style of governance and, as Hatta pointed out, was 
in complete contrast to that of the Dutch. Whereas the Dutch preferred an indirect 
hierarchical rule that relied, in part, on divisions constructed between colonial subjects, 
Japan, with its ideology of Pan-Asianism, sought to integrate all Asians as "brothers" 
under its rule. Central to the Japanese Occupation was the mobilization of civilians, 
especially the youth, for the Asia-Pacific war. Japanese historian Goto Ken'ichi 
indicates that, in a short period of time, as many as "37,000 young men in Java alone 
received strict military training and ideological education under the banner of 'defense 
of the fatherland,' a program that would have been unimaginable under Dutch rule."92
This wartime mobilization was in stark contrast to the Dutch quest for "peaceful" 
colonization in the Indies. If the training of the city guard by the Dutch produced only 
scarecrows who were afraid of aircraft and ghosts, "the training course of Japan for 
Indonesian youth was designed to instantly turn them into cruel beings who would
91 Mohamad Hatta, as cited in Goto Ken'ichi, "Modern Japan and Indonesia: The Dynamics and Legacy of 
Wartime Rule," in Japan, Indonesia, and the War, ed. by Peter Post and Elly Touwen-Bouwsma (Leiden: 
KITLV Press, 1997), p. 20. Ken'ichi remarked that this statement made by Hatta via radio should be 
understood within the context of Japanese military censorship. Yet, the statement still indicates an 
important aspect of the Japanese Occupation that influenced the outlook of Indonesians. For Kwee Thiam 
Tjing (Tjamboek Berdoeri), an ethnic Chinese, "the new environment [under the Japanese military] had 
eliminated the freedom which once existed, at least in the mind of the people." See Kwee, Indonesia dalem 
Api dan Bara, p. 156.
92 Ken'ichi, "Modern Japan and Indonesia," p. 21.
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follow order."93 While Kwee Thiam Tjing found no one paying attention to the city 
guard in Malang, under the Japanese Occupation, by contrast, Indonesians were 
instructed to stop and pay respect to the city guard. Where the city guards under the 
Dutch were trained with disciplinary protocols, the Japanese "little brothers" were 
treated with corporal punishment. "Even a small mistake would receive slapping, 
kicking, and hitting."94 In a short period of time, as R. Joesoef, a high-ranking police 
officer, indicated in his brief report, many Indonesians were appointed as policemen 
and very soon "everyone knew very well how to march properly."95
Changes were not only taking place at the level of government. The everyday life 
of Indonesians was restructured during the Japanese Occupation through participatory 
works that were intended to lead to a meaningful goal—the liberation of Indonesians 
from Western imperialism. One of the most important pieces of apparatus used to 
incorporate Indonesian people of various backgrounds into a unified citizenry capable 
of running the occupied region (in resistance to the "European colonizer") was the 
tonarigumi (neighborhood association). The system of tonarigumi was imposed in both 
urban and rural areas. In each case, ten to twenty adjacent households were organized 
to share community responsibilities designed to ensure both order within that 
community and loyalty to the government.96 This technique of community 
"mobilization and control" was perhaps developed first in the Japanese colonies in 
Korea, Manchuria, and Taiwan before it was imported back to Japan in the late 1930s 
to organize Japan's own citizens for the coming war.97 In the Japanese occupied 
territory of Indonesia, the neighborhood was parceled into several units, and 
communal life was institutionalized, all in order to help Japan to win the war in Asia. 
Aiko Kurasawa reported that "the total number of tonarigumi for the whole of Java was 
508,745, and the total number of households was 8,967,320. These figures mean that 
there was approximately one tonarigumi for every seventeen to eighteen households."98 
Some twelve households in each cluster would become "a big family with mutual love
93 Kwee, Indonesia dalem Api dan Bara, p. 138. In this book, Kwee records the effects of Japanese occupation 
on the subjectivity of Indonesians.
94 Ibid., p. 153. At the level of everyday life, things were worse for the Chinese in Indonesia. Kwee 
indicates that looting and robbing were among the methods Japan used to subjugate its colonial subjects. 
The bull's eye was pinned on the Chinese community, which "had been accustomed to be the target of 
violence, no matter under which government and under what flag." Ibid., p. 64. Kwee continues: "One of 
the habits of Japanese troops was breaking into the houses and shops belong to Chinese. Once the door 
was opened, they casually took things, often of little value, and walked away as if nothing had happened. 
They purposefully did this under the watchful eyes of Indonesian (as well as Chinese) thugs who gathered 
around the building. Seeing how the Japanese so easily stole things belonging to other people, the thugs 
eventually gained courage to not only pick up small things, but to steal everything possible (including 
windows and doors) from the houses and shops they visited." Ibid., p. 125.
95 R. Joesoef, "Keamanan di kota Bandoeng," Tjahaja, 2602 (1942).
96 According to Aiko Kurasawa and an announcement by the Japanese government issued on January 11, 
1944, the tasks of the tonarigumi included: assisting security in the neighborhood by combating spies and 
criminals and keeping watch against air raids; notifying residents of government instructions, increasing 
food production, and distributing goods; promoting mutual aid among inhabitants; and serving the 
government in military affairs. See Aiko Kurasawa, "Mobilization and Control: A Study of Social Change 
in Rural Java, 1842-45" (PhD dissertation, Cornell University, 1988).
97 See Naoki Yoshihara and Raphaella Dewantari Dwianto, Grass Roots and the Neighborhood Associations:
On Japan's Chonaikai and Indonesia's RT/RW (Jakarta: Gramedia Widiasarana Indonesia, 2003), p. 18.
98 Kurasawa, "Mobilization and Control," p. 286.
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and help, just like in one's own family" with father(s) as the head(s) of the group, even 
though the tonarigumi "was mostly taken care of by women."99
Central to the tonarigumi was the security organization called Keibodan, whose 
members were inhabitants of the neighborhood. The job of the Keibodan, according to 
Aboe Djamal, one of the community leaders from the island of Madura, was basically 
policing.
The task involves some secrecy in order to combat espionage, to check the 
circulation of goods, to watch over security, to help defend against air raids, to 
increase the production and delivery of paddy and other crops, and to observe 
people under suspicions, especially those along coastal area.100
Figure 23: Note top right insert. Members of Keibodan measure the state of security in a gardu with kampung 
watchmen in the background. Source: Djaum Baroe 16, August 15,1944.
Community vigilance of this sort was strengthened by the imposition of collective 
responsibility for supervising the behavior of one's fellow tonarigumi members. 
Everyone in the community was responsible for preventing espionage or 
antigovernment activities, as well as watching out for undesirable ways of thinking 
and lifestyles in their neighborhood. They were also asked to contribute financially to 
the operation of the Keibodan. The Japanese military administration made steady use of 
Keibodan and co-opted the neighborhood chiefs of the towns and villages in Java to 
coordinate the operation of these neighborhood units. Above all, it made use of the
99 S. Ozu, "Roeangan Wanita: Tonarigumi," Sinar Baroe, 2603 duly 5,1943), p. 3.
100 "Setahun Keibodan: Langkah Menoejoe keamanan: Tjorak persamaan dan persahabatan, Sinar Baroe, 
2604 (May 1,1944), p. 3.
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gardu to coordinate mutual household surveillance. In Figure 23 (above; note top right 
insert), we see a picture of a gardu taken from within, signifying the incorporation of 
Japanese military practice into the daily life of an Indonesian neighborhood. This kind 
of shot would not have been taken by the Dutch, who, for reasons delineated above, 
could only see the gardu from a detached position exterior to the building.
The Japanese military government was very careful in harnessing the practice of 
the neighborhood watch. Members of Keibodan were portrayed as working together, in 
the spirit of mutual help (gotong rojong) with the kampung guard (pendjaga kampoeng) of 
the neighborhood. For the Japanese government, the gardu could be seen as the symbol 
of the cooperation between the state and the neighborhood. The gardu was not merely 
the representation of kampung security, but also a stimulus for a stronger "spirit of 
mutual help [gotong rojong]" between the state and the community.101 If the policemen 
under Dutch colonial rule were seen as belonging to the realm of the outsider because 
they "rarely entered the kampung but carefully patrolled the asphalt roads that 
encircled them,"102 the Keibodan ruled the kampung from within, working hand-in-hand 
with the pendjaga kampoeng of the neighborhood.103
The Sinar Baroe newspaper noted:
... all kampong residents have contributed as much as they could by becoming 
part of the Keibodan, which is the key institution that watches over matters 
concerning security. Today, gardus (also called roemah djaga during this time) 
have been built at various places, and every night members of the Keibodan 
have been guarding the community. The public knows how useful the 
nightwatch is. So don't hesitate to contribute financially for the construction of 
more roemah djaga.104
Thus, we can say that the Japanese abolished the dual (or plural) system of Dutch 
colonial administration by creating the institution of Keibodan to bridge the separated 
worlds. Through an identification with and involvement in the gardu, the Japanese
101 "Keibodan dan pendjaga kampoeng," Sinar Baroe, 2603 (May 19,1943), p. 2.
102 As told to Bill Frederick by an informant in 1977. See Bill Frederick, "Indonesian Urban Society in 
Transition: Surabaya, 1926-1946" (PhD dissertation, University of Hawaii, 1978), pp. 49-50.
103 The guardhouse also represented the command structure and pedagogical apparatus of Japan's military 
administration. This function took place outside the kampung, in the crowded urban space where public 
buildings (such as stations and markets) were located. Soon after the Occupation, the Japanese military 
government ordered the construction of guardhouses for its policemen. Considering this as a new decree, 
Sinar Baroe reported that the guardhouse would allow the policemen to work day and night. However, 
there were other functions of these new guardhouses that were more symbolic. The Japanese military had 
issued an instruction that everyone who bumped into a policeman on a street should stop and pay respect 
(hormat) by performing a prescribed gesture. Yet, to the annoyance of the authorities, many people were 
still ignorant of this order, even though a large sign (which said "must give respect to the police guard") 
had been placed fifteen meters from many of the guardhouses to remind passers-by of their obligations. 
Thus we can suggest that the Japanese erected guardhouses at strategic spots to create a permanent visual 
focus for passers-by, so that they could see the new authority and know where the hormat could be 
performed. In this sense, the guardhouse made visible the body of the colonial administration while 
articulating a formal pedagogy for the disciplining of its subject. See "Roemah-roemah Djaga Polisi," Sinar 
Baroe, 2602 (page number and date unclear in original). See also "Memberi hoermat pada polisi djaga," 
Sinar Baroe, 2602 (November 16,1942). Sinar Baroe kept reminding readers to pay respect to the police 
guard. The newspaper highlighted messages concerning hormat and published easy-to-understand 
drawings of how to pay respect to the guard.
104 "Pendjagaan Kampoeng," Kanpo Sinar Baroe, August 2,1943, p. 4.
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military government replaced the Dutch colonial governance with a centralized system 
based on direct state intervention into community life.
Within a year, the Japanese military government in the occupied region of 
Indonesia had already institutionalized the culture of the gardu. In Solo, Sinar Baroe 
reported that:
... all the kampung people [rakyat] have been mobilized to watch over the security 
of their kampungs. Regulations have been imposed without any distinctions 
between the rich and the poor. As the rear guard supporting forces at the front, 
every inhabitant in the kampung is obliged to watch over the security of his or her 
neighborhood. Those who resist will be punished and, if necessary, be expelled 
from his/her kampong.105
The gardu combined communal memories with forced aspirations. Yet, it is with 
this mix of politics and everyday life that the gardu played a significant role not only in 
commanding and maintaining order at a local level, but also serving as a symbol of 
Japan's ideology in Asia: the unification of all the colonized peoples in resisting 
"Western power." The practice of collectively guarding one's neighborhood brought 
together people from various ethnicities and classes. The Sinar Baroe reported instances 
where Indonesians, Arabs, Chinese, Indians, Malays, and Javanese cooperated as 
members of the gardu in their co-surveillance of each other's communities. The practice 
of nightwatch cut across differences in class and status. "Even an aristocrat [bangsawan\ 
or a prince would fulfill the obligation of nightwatch with his clerk or servant of his 
palace."106 Perhaps in order to live with this new institutional requirement that 
imposed communalism, S. P. Pakoealaman, one of the princes in Central Java, found it 
necessary to suppress the power hierarchy of his realm. He proclaimed that the spirit 
of tonarigumi could indeed be found in the Kedjawen (a belief system of the Javanese), 
and it should therefore be valued as part of the ancestral heritage of the nation (pusaka 
tanah air dan leloehoer). Pakoealaman declared: "I hope tonarigumi will spread the 
feeling of care for all people in our nation as well as reviving our belief system in order 
to expel the [individualistic] slogan of: 'who you are, and who I am' [sopo siro sopo 
ingsoen]."107 Through the practice of co-surveillance, the gardu supposedly brought 
together people from various ethnicities and classes, all on the same platform, 
watching others as well as being watched. Despite the fact that it certainly projected 
Japan's military values, the gardu seemed to make claims for both a new future—the 
liberation of Indonesians from the subjection of Dutch colonialism—and the 
continuation of an age-old gardu tradition inherited from "our" ancestors.
Once Indonesians conceived of gardu as the embodiment of their nation's imagined 
past and future, it became part of a shared national culture, an institution that 
apparently reinforced their own cultural practices. Yet culture does not operate in a 
vacuum. Instructions published in the state-sponsored popular media, such as Sinar 
Baroe, reminded Indonesians that this "invented tradition" was their own and advised 
them how they ought to practice it. As noted earlier, the Dutch (especially through the
105 "Solo: Menjaga keamanan kampoeng," Sinar Baroe, 2603 (August 18,1943).
106 "Setahun Keibodan: Langkah Menoejoe keamanan: Tjorak persamaan dan persahabatan, Sinar Baroe, 
2604 (May 1,1944), p. 3.
107 "Tonari Gumi di lantik dengan resmi oleh S.P. Pakoealaman-Ko," Sinar Baroe 2604 (fanuary 6,1944),
p. 2.
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Ethical Policy) did contribute to the discourses of gardu, especially the idea of gotong 
royong, and they helped establish it as an archetype of Javanese tradition, but 
instructions for systematizing, organizing, and popularizing this newly recognized 
archetype to facilitate social and political control were not issued until the Japanese 
Occupation.
Yet, from what perspective was it possible for the Japanese military administration 
to view gardus and security watch as embodying an age-old tradition of 
Java/Indonesia/Asia? There were at least two conditions that had helped turn the 
practice of gardu into a "traditional" institution. First, as part of the discourse 
advocating liberation from the West, Japan encouraged Indonesians to identify 
themselves with cultures that were supposedly "non-Western." In this sense, the urge 
to differentiate Asia from the West transformed the institution of gardu into a definitive 
tradition of the East.
Second, and perhaps more important, the tonarigumi was, in fact, derived from the 
Chinese Pao-Tjia system of defense, which had been known since the Song dynasty and 
which Lombard has suggested might have been implemented by ethnic Chinese 
throughout coastal Java long before the colonial era, as noted above.108 Since the 
Japanese had spread across Asia, occupying vast territories, including a number of 
European colonies (and, notably, the territories of their own East Asian neighbors), 
they had no trouble perceiving the existing practices of gardu and nightwatch as the 
embodiment of Pan-Asian Eastern culture. In other words, when the Japanese military 
administration arrived in Java, the practices of neighborhood watch and the gardus 
were available as part of a repertoire that the administration could retrieve, repackage, 
and redistribute in the form of tonarigumi to every part of Java and Indonesia. Japan 
formalized the practice by encouraging this supposed tradition in order to recruit the 
colonized in its campaign against the West.
By the end of the Japanese Occupation, Indonesian youth, unlike Kwee Thiam 
Tjing, felt they were equipped to guard the cities of Indonesia, which by then had 
entered the era of Revolution. Their experiences and confidence would affect 
Indonesian subjectivity during this all-important transitional period.
The Gardu Effects: Pemuda in the Time o f Revolution
Following the surrender of the Japanese military government and the declaration 
of Indonesian independence, much of the country was plunged into a period of 
bloodshed and violence that claimed many thousands of lives. Neither of the official 
combatants—the new Republic of Indonesia and the returning Netherlands Indies 
Colonial Administration (NICA)—was capable of restoring order. They fought against 
each other, while taking advantage of unofficial militias to foment more political 
violence. Yet each side was perfectly aware of the importance of order and security as 
the basis for the consolidation of power. The country was divided and engaged in the 
discourses of order and disorder as violence continued, especially at the "neutral," but 
shifting, boundaries that divided the two forces.
108 Denys Lombard, Nusa Jawa: Silang Budaya II: Jaringan Asia, p. 278.
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Efforts were nevertheless made to ensure security and order. In Jakarta, for 
instance, the British Military Police, which served as a temporary, officially neutral, 
peacekeeping force, soon formed police units to end the political violence in the city.109 
Following the Dutch system of plural governments, each ethnic group was delegated 
the task of safeguarding its own neighborhood. Meanwhile the Dutch military 
instituted a system of territorial control by issuing military passes for those who 
traveled along main roads. It also announced the security zones and listed the 
boundaries of these protected territories in Indonesian newspapers.110 In a similar 
move, the Indonesian National Military (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, TNI) established 
"commando posts" in villages and at the borders to ensure security and order.111 Travel 
documents (often in the form of a reference letter) were marked by dates as one moved 
across borders. The "commando posts" served as check points as well as markers of 
the boundaries of the Indonesian state. Outside of these official measures, various 
communities also took the initiative of forming their own security organizations, 
especially in the secondary cities and smaller towns, where rampages and killings by 
unofficial militias continued unchecked. Chinese Indonesians, a traditionally 
vulnerable group, formed their own security organizations, such as the Pao An Tui.112
The time of revolution was thus marked by patrols and neighborhood watches 
(■ronda) in the city and the countryside. It was also the period in which Indonesian 
political identities and identification, and ways of expressing them in the public space, 
were critical. "Outward appearances" were crucial, not only for social navigation and a 
sense of orientation, but also for survival.113 Signs were inscribed on buildings to 
mobilize cultural identifications and indicate affiliation. Of particular importance was 
the right combination of color (red and white symbolizing the national flag of 
Indonesia, and red, white, and blue symbolizing the Dutch). Out of this struggle for 
independence and identification, groups of young fighters, who came to be known 
collectively as pemuda (those with youthful spirit, ready to fight for Independence) 
emerged in the urban centers encompassed by Indonesia's territory.114 The pemuda 
considered themselves to be the guards of the nation.
In 1951, Pramoedya Ananta Toer wrote Di Tepi Kali Bekasi (At the Edge of Bekasi 
River). Pramoedya illustrates the formation of pemuda members who, after 
experiencing the wartime mobilization by Japan, emerged as freedom fighters for the 
Republic of Indonesia. Young Farid, the protagonist, admires Japan's military units, 
called barisan jibaku, and especially the pasukan kamikaze, special troops willing to carry
109 Robert Cribb, "Law and Order in Occupied Jakarta, 1946" (paper prepared at the conference on 
"Decolonization and Daily Life in Asia and Africa," Netherlands Institute for War Documentation, 
Amsterdam, December 11-13, 2003).
110 "Penghapusan pas militer sepandjang djalan-raja (hoofdwegen)," Soeloeh Ra'jat, November, 13,1947,
p. 2.
111 See "Commandopost TNI," Soeloeh Ra'jat, October 20,1947, p. 1; the article includes a picture of the 
commando post.
112 "Maksoed satoe-satoenja mendjaga keamanan bersama," Soeloeh Ra'jat (December 15,1947), p. 3
113 For a discussion on the importance of appearances, especially clothing in Indonesia across various 
orders, see Henk Schulte Nordholt, ed., Outward Appearances: Dressing State and Society in Indonesia 
(Leiden: KITLV Press, 1997).
114 For an analysis of pemuda style, see William Frederick, "The Appearance of Revolution: Cloth, Uniform, 
and the Pemuda Style in East Java, 1945-1949," in Outward Appearances: Dressing State and Society in 
Indonesia, pp. 199-248. See also Benedict Anderson, Java in a Time o f Revolution: Occupation and Resistance, 
1944-1946 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1972).
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out suicidal missions for their cause. He also admires, even though he cannot fully 
understand, the forces that created such forms of sacrifice. He realizes that "the 
national consciousness of Indonesians had been awakened by the Japanese ... The 
Dutch gave only a colonial mentality to Indonesian people ... to the old man in front of 
him."115 Farid considers himself a new man. He is the type that the pretty Nanny, 
another character in the novel, finds attractive: "... the young, strong, and vigorous 
man. His bravery, perseverance, and sacrifice for the nation are just like those of Amir 
[her late boy friend, who had died in the Revolution]."116 Describing this young hero 
through the eyes of Nanny, Pramoedya constructs a new type of man, the pemuda, who 
was born out of the Japanese Occupation into the Indonesian revolution and came to 
be recognized as a guard.
In one way or another, Indonesians were both fascinated and terrified by their 
experiences during the Japanese Occupation. This ambivalence powerfully formed 
their new subjectivity. Almost a year after Japan's surrender, the Kedaulatan Rakjat 
newspaper recalled one of the last impressions of the Occupation: "All the Japanese 
detainees, from soldiers to high officers, saluted by bending their bodies in front of our 
troops standing in the guardhouse at the camp."117 Such quotes make it clear that 
Indonesians had taken note of the acts of respect the Japanese military showed to 
Indonesia's defensive forces—their native guards. The struggle over the identity of the 
pemuda, who represented themselves, consciously or unconsciously, as the guards of 
the nation, was shaped by such memories.
The following photograph, taken in the early revolutionary period, tells us 
something about the pemuda, how they were perceived and their perceptions of 
themselves. In this photograph, "a typical image of the revolutionary era," we see a 
group of young men standing in front of the camera (see Figure 24).118
Figure 24: "Where is your letter of reference, bung?": Pemuda guarding the city. Source: Lukisan Revolusi 
Rakjat Indonesia, 1945-1949 (Yogyakarta: Kementerian Penerangan Republik Indonesia, 1949).
115 Pramoedya Ananta Toer, Di Tepi Kidi Bekasi (Jakarta: Lantera Dipantara, 2003 [1951]), p. 99.
116 Ibid., p. 123.
117 Kedaulatan Rakyat, May 20,1946. As cited in A. B. Lapian, ed., Semangat '45 Datum Rekaman Gambar 
IPPHOS (Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 1985), n.p.
118 Soedjarwo, ed., Lukisan Revolusi Rakjat Indonesia, 1945-1949 (Yogyakarta: Kementerian Penerangan 
Republik Indonesia, 1949), n.p.
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Having secured rifles and weapons, pemuda posed as the guards of the city. This 
image suggests that the practice of gardu adapted during the Japanese Occupation had 
spilled over into the revolution. The pemuda marked their presence in the city with the 
same spirit that animated the guards under the Japanese Occupation. They might 
belong to the Indonesian national army, and/or the unofficial militias (the fighting 
groups called laskar), but their stylistic formation (at least in this photograph) recalls 
the image of the security guards standing at the gardu. It is an image Indonesians 
would expect to confront as they approached the entrance to a guarded neighborhood. 
These youth represent the city (in ruins) behind them. They consider the city as being 
under their guard and see themselves as its protectors, as well as the destroyers of 
things associated with the enemy. Patrolling in self-styled uniforms, they considered 
themselves to be the vanguard of the newly liberated world of the Indonesian masses 
(the rakyat). They took the urban space as a gigantic canvas on which they inscribed 
writings, slogans, and flags associated with this new time and new identity. They saw 
themselves as the embodiment of order and security, even though many of them 
participated in political violence and acts of destruction.
In the early outburst of revolutionary fervor, there was at least a half-dozen or 
more of these different fighting groups constituted of so-called pemuda. Clothed in 
different styles, they did not identify themselves with any particular political or 
ideological position. While sharing a vision of a unified struggle for independence, 
they were also involved in competitive, intricate, and shifting alliances. Political 
identity was at stake during this period. The uniforms, as William Frederick indicates, 
allowed for differentiation, identification, and group formation.119 Those who lived in 
the city or in areas under the influence of the pemuda had to be careful not to excite the 
suspicions of these guards. It was important that passers-by give the right response to 
the frequently asked question: "Where is your surat keterangan [letter of reference], 
bung [brother]?"120 Like the guard in the gardu, the pemuda, too, checked the political 
identity of the people they met and decided whether the person was an ally or an 
enemy.
The vigilant permuda member differed from the usual guard stationed in a gardu 
and from a policeman controlled by the state, however, because he did not recognize 
boundaries established by the Dutch or the Indonesian military.121 Pemuda militia 
forces were often seen, fully or partially armed, patrolling across the city and the 
countryside. They blurred boundaries by moving around, claiming territories, 
prowling from the outskirts of the city into the villages, and checking neighborhoods 
throughout a large area to discover the political affiliations of the inhabitants. 
Imagining themselves as the guards of the new revolutionary society, the pemuda 
spread their political influence from the cities into the villages, even though the 
villagers were mostly afraid of them.
119 Frederick, "The Appearance of Revolution."
120 Sudjarwo, ed., Lukisan Revolusi Rakjat Indonesia, 1945-1949, n.p.
121 This area remained a war zone for most of the revolutionary period. Newspapers were filled with 
reports claiming that "civilians living close to the demarcation line have been continuously harassed" and 
"patrollers and posts of the Dutch army were fired on twenty times." See "Keadaan militer," Soeloeh Ra'jat, 
June 19,1947, p. 2.
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Securing the State and Becoming a Tradition
The pemuda, the returning Dutch colonial administration, and the Republic of 
Indonesia struggled to consolidate power by offering different safety measures to the 
people. We do not know if the gardu during the late revolutionary period were 
inscribed with markers of group identity and political party, like those poskos of the 
PDI-P, but each of these constituencies was certainly involved in the maintenance and 
expansion of its sphere of influence. These struggles for territory and the establishment 
of political identities intensified toward the end of the revolution, after Indonesia 
gained its sovereignty and the Dutch gave up the fight. In 1949, the TNI announced 
that "in matters of security, a person should not act on his own but should follow the 
law initiated by the authority of our nation."122 Yet, as the new Republic of Indonesia 
gained in authority, some of the laskar militia groups continued to see themselves as 
the guardians, not merely of a city or a kampung, but of the country as a whole. 
Inspired by this image of themselves, they felt responsibility towards the future of the 
country and acted on its behalf by fighting even the newly formed Republic of 
Indonesia. One such group was the Darul Islam, which sought to lead the new 
Republic under the banner of Islam. To achieve this end, it identified the Republic as 
its enemy. In turn, the Republic labeled the Darul Islam forces as gerombolan 
(wandering rebels). Now that the revolution had ended and the young state was being 
forged, particular political and ideological positions became an issue among 
Indonesians. Within the force field of order and security, so crucial to the legitimation 
of power of the new Republic, the gardu made its appearance. Perhaps the best way to 
indicate this is by looking at an image shown in the official photo album, Thirty Years o f 
Indonesian Independence.
In Figure 25 (below), we see "the troops [pasukan] of the New Republic marching 
down the field to conduct operations [against the Darul Islam] in January 1951."123
A guardhouse stands in the background, marking the safe territory of the Republic. 
In this gardu are children and women looking at the camera and at the troops marching 
to an unknown destination, presumably into the untamed areas where they might find 
the “gerombolan Darul Islam." The camera makes the gardu appear as a point of origin 
from which the troops depart and to which they are supposed to return. This 
construction appears to anchor the Indonesian home, which is inhabited by children 
and women waiting for their soldiers to return. As the "home" of the Republic, the 
gardu not only represents the territorial identity of the Republic, but is also an index of 
security, as several guards can be seen standing around it. Unlike the marching troops, 
these local guards appear relaxed and at home. Thus, the gardu and the troops, 
together, delineate a territorial identity, demarcating the areas of the known and the 
unknown.
The caption that accompanies this image does not make any reference to the gardu. 
Instead it only calls our attention to the forces of the Republic. The gardu is a familiar 
structure, so familiar that no comment is needed. We do not know whether this 
guardhouse was built under the order of the new Republic of Indonesia or if it was 
part of the structure of community defense harnessed by the pasukan republic during
122 "Awas Intimidasi dan Provokasi," Kedaulatan Rakjat, December 12,1949.
123 30 Tahun Indonesia Merdeka, 1945-1955 (Jakarta: Sekretariat Negara Republik Indonesia, 1997), p. 353, 
figure 416.
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the Occupation. We do know, however, that it represents order and security, as well as 
a potential threat. In the picture, at least, it "belongs" to the Republic of Indonesia. 
Could we say that the gardu animates subjectivity? Could it be seen as not only acting 
for people, but also acting upon them? In what ways does the gardu affect the 
formation of culture and tradition?
Figure 25: Troops departing from the gardu. Source: 30 Tahun Indonesia Merdeka, 1945-1955 
(Jakarta: Sekretariat Negara Republik Indonesia, 1997), p. 353, no. 416.
Thirty years after the Darul Islam uprising, Edi S. Ekadjati, a Sundanese 
intellectual, recalled the security system of the gardu (garduh, in Sundanese) as 
belonging to a system of traditional defense characteristic of the Sunda land. Ekadjati 
remembers the village of Karangtawang, in West Java, during the war with Darul 
Islam. Knowing that the pasukan republic was still incapable of fully protecting the 
village, several initiatives were taken by the inhabitants of the desa. Ekadjati describes 
how members of the community fenced their whole village with bamboo stakes two 
meters high. They also organized a ronda and built several gardus, each of which was 
equipped with khokol (the kentongan),124 In addition, the village also conducted periodic 
mass prayers and even mobilized the magical spirits of the village (in the forms of "jin" 
and "tiger") to safeguard the neighborhood.125 Since all these activities were supposed 
to be part of the village's "tradition," no difficulties in implementing these measures 
were recorded. Every member of the "village community" seemed to know this 
"traditional defense system." Like so many cultural practices understood as tradition, 
the gardu and its rituals had been internalized and naturalized regardless of the fact
124 Edi S. Ekadjati, "Tulak Bala: Sistim Pertahanan Tradisional Kasus Desa Karangtawang, Kabupaten 
Kuningan, Jawa Barat," in Tulak Bala: Sistim Pertahanan Tradisional Masyarakat Sunda dan Kajian Lainnya 
mengenai Budaya Sunda (Bandung: Pusat Studi Sunda, 2003), p. 20.
125 Ibid., p. 23.
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that they were constructed out of a variety of contexts, many of which were political 
and circumstantial.
In Ekadjati's account, the power of gardu stemmed from the continuous 
reenactment of these self-defensive initiatives as practices of everyday life, practices 
supported by a narrative associating them with timeless tradition. As a recognized 
"tradition," the gardu has gained a life of its own, one that does not necessarily require 
a documented history but is capable of retrieving various memories, even though one 
may not know where these memories originated. Like all "traditions" once they have 
been initiated, the gardu simultaneously mark all-time and no-time. For instance, in 
1999, after the fall of Suharto, Mangara Siahaan, the Vice Secretary General of PDI-P, 
said that "posko was a symbol that could move people [massa] at any time. It is a symbol 
of power ... [and] when we set up the idea of posko, people [masyarakat] were 
enthusiastic."126 Perhaps precisely because of the ahistorical nature of "tradition," the 
gardu is seen as possessing a power of its own. For Ekadjati and Siahaan, the potency of 
gardu as a symbol could be easily retrieved. It might be invested with various 
meanings, but it continues to retain its "power." And as a "traditional" practice, it 
seems to be capable of performing multiple social roles and moving easily across time 
and space. Yet, as we have seen, the Indonesian gardu moves not only across orders, 
but also touches various grounds, including the realm of the state and the domain of 
daily life. It is not only an outward sign of a social and political phenomenon; it is also 
an institution of everyday life that actively constitutes the social norms and behavior of 
people who live in and around it.
Dispersed Receptions
The collective experience of guarding a neighborhood and the nation has been 
transmitted from one generation to another and carried into the postcolonial era. The 
beating of the kentongan during nightwatch continues to this day. The gardu, the ronda, 
and the codes of the kentongan have been carried over from other times and have 
become part of the structure of everyday life in both the cities and the villages of 
Indonesia (see Figure 26, below).127
The gardu remains instrumental in the symbolic spectacle of the state's (as well as 
individuals') power, even as its appearance often evokes, in the minds of the public, 
the decline of the state's authority. It continues to register class status, prestige, and, of 
course, "manpower." Yet for some ethnic groups—notably the ethnic Chinese—it can 
also trigger memories of anti-ethnic riots. It keeps alive the culture of rumors, the 
practices of the nightwatch, and the surveillance of the streets. For most men in Java, it 
remains an enjoyable place for drinking, chatting, and gazing at women who are 
walking along the street.
For many women, the gardu is highly gendered and based practically and 
historically (if not also theoretically) on the exclusion of women. For them, it continues
126 As cited in "Ancaman dari posko-posko PDIP," Demokrasi dan Reformasi, August 9-14,1999, p. 28 
(emphasis added).
127 For an account of a neighborhood watch in a Javanese city during the New Order, see James T. Siegel, 
Solo in the New Order: Language and Hierarchy in an Indonesian City (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1986), chap. 2 and 3.
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to be an unsettling place that is dominated by men. For other members of the society, it 
awakens memories of urban militarism, Sukarno's street-based populist politics, and 
"communist threats." The gardu integrates these different memories into the 
consciousness of the city.
Figure 26: Lik ekota, like dcrn: PakDirman and his gardu in Jakarta, 2003. Photo: F. Prihadi.
Yet, like many other urban forms in the contemporary world, the Indonesian gardu can 
also be seen as part of the gated-community phenomenon, in which private security, 
middle-class prestige, community surveillance, and corporate power intermingle (see 
Figure 27).
Figure 27: Selling property, selling gardu: The "Taman Paris" of Lippo Karawaci. 
Source: Brochure of Lippo Karawaci, obtained 2002.
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In this context, the gardu absorbs into its sphere images of other times and spaces, 
while isolating them in the dreamworld of Disney-like cosmopolitanism. In this 
isolated world, it stands as a reminder to the developers and consumers of expensive 
housing that urban threats surround them. In urban Indonesia, this global impulse to 
erect gardu has intertwined, often unnoticeably, with particular trajectories of pre­
colonial, colonial, and postcolonial histories. In this crosscut, it seems that older modes 
of representation have returned to the present as cultural resources, while new 
trajectories have been opened up.
During the 1998 student uprising across Indonesia, many gardus of the state (the pos 
hansips) were taken over by students and became important gathering points 
nationwide for forces that helped bring about the fall of Suharto. In 2001, in Papua, the 
emergence of the pro-independence protest movement against the Indonesian state 
was marked by the construction of poskos that displayed the movement's Morning Star 
flag. In response, the provincial authorities launched a series of coordinated raids on 
the poskos.128
Closer to home, the appointment of a new head of the administered neighborhood 
(RT) where my parents are staying was marked by the construction of yet another 
gardu at another corner of the street, thus increasing the collection of gardus in the area. 
Written on the wall of the gardu is a new term, "posko-hansip," which bridges the New 
Order and post-New Order periods. The newly elected Pak RT (head of the Rukun 
Tetangga), who is a civilian of ethnic Chinese background, quite spontaneously felt that 
"the election of a new RT should be marked by the building of a new gardu,” 
regardless of the fact that there are already six guardhouses within a radius of thirty 
meters. One of the residents of the neighborhood told me, humorously, that "it is 
through the gardu that the Pak RT will be remembered." What then has happened to 
the "old" gardul Some of them have become the houses of the guards (Pak hansip), in 
which one can find a pantry and a bed. One particular gardu I saw had been enlarged 
and equipped outside with an old sofa. As this gardu grows deeper and becomes more 
like a tiny house, the interior has gotten darker. From inside that darkness, eyes see 
without being seen.
The gardu as a community institution has figured in the work of contemporary 
writers. In 2004, Anwar Hudijono, a newspaper commentator, published his 
commentaries in a small book titled Gardu. In the introduction, Anwar explained why 
he chose this title.
[My] writings are light and relaxed, just like chatting in the gardu. Talking in the 
gardu has no order and direction, unlike discussion on TV or in a seminar. 
Everything can be talked about with ease ['ngomong ngalor-ngidul']. What is 
important is participation ... spontaneous ... and egalitarian.129
128 Joe Sounders, "Indonesia: Violence and Political Impasse in Papua," Human Rights Watch Report 13,2 
(July 2001): IV, "The Wamena Violence."
129 Anwar Hudijono, Gardu: Refleksi Sosial Menuju Kehidupan yang Demokratis (Jakarta: Grasindo, 2004), pp. 
ix-x.
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While its social atmosphere can be relaxing, the gardu of Anwar is also meant to be a 
catalyst for "social change towards a more democratic life ... With Gardu, we will be 
able to reflect on various events and ultimately act on them for social change."130
Figure 28: The gendered civic space of gardu: "The free speech that goes bla, bla, bla."
Source: Benny Rachmnadi and Muh. Misrad, Lagak Jakarta: Reformasi (Jakarta: Kepustakaan Popular
Gramedia, 1998), p. 47.
The appearance of the gardu in this context is less important than its function. In 
Anwar's mind, it is a monument by virtue of its capacity to evoke conversation and 
even social change. It is a modest institution for transforming the nation. His gardu, like 
those of Megawati, Suharto, Kwee Thiam Tjing, the Dutch, the Chinese, the Japanese, 
the pemuda, and Pak RT, has become a medium for the projection of aspirations, values, 
power, fear, desires, and, of course, "tradition."
Conclusion
Guardhouses (gardu/posko/pos-hansip) have complex roots in Indonesia. I have 
shown how these structures survived in many different forms, operating as artifacts 
for memorialization, as well as for constructing spatial identity. I have traced the 
gardu's "origins" in the spatial politics of Dutch colonialism and the experience of the 
ethnic Chinese and shown how it was eventually institutionalized under the Japanese 
military administration and mobilized in the postcolonial era as an autochthonous 
tradition. Over time, the gardu has found its place in the collective memory of 
Indonesians, a memory that could be retrieved at any time and under any condition.
I have followed a long circle, from the present into the past and back, suggesting 
the interdependence of various sites and the historic roles of the ethnic Chinese, Dutch 
colonialism, and the Japanese Occupation. I have also integrated different memories
130 Hudijono, Gardu, cover.
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and the many modes of representations that affect the meaning of the gardu. I have 
shown that each experience of the gardu is to some degree affected by the historical 
experiences of other times, which have been transmitted across generations through 
the recurrence of the gardu itself. This interweaving of experiences across time and 
space is crucial for an understanding of the persistence, as well as the proliferation, of 
gardus in contemporary urban Indonesia. As I have sought to illustrate the importance 
of interwoven collective memories in understanding the reiteration of gardus, I have 
also sought to make gardus visible, to conceptualize their public nature, to interpret 
their power, and to investigate the formation of subjectivity in urban Indonesia. Yet, as 
with other attempts to trace social memories and the evolution of subjectivities, there is 
no end to the story. The life history of the gardu remains discursive, fragmented, and 
incomplete, but it seems to me the spatial and temporal circle offered in this paper has 
been completed.
